

A FAITH-BASED PROGRAM EVALUATION: MORAL DEVELOPMENT
OF SEMINARY STUDENTS AT THE LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation was to conduct an outcomes-based program evaluation for the Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola) campus of the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary. The study included one primary research question, with two subquestions. The primary research question asked to what extent students in the program developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. The first subquestion asked whether statistically significant differences existed in the moral reasoning of students of different class years. The second subquestion asked whether statistically significant differences existed in the moral reasoning of students of different personality types.

A cross-sectional study was conducted with students during the fall of 2005 using the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) instruments. All 101 program students were invited to participate in the study. To provide a benchmark for student scores, 30 Seminary faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2. The student response rates were 94% for the DIT-2 instrument and 97% for the MBTI instrument. The response rate for faculty was 20%.

After removing two outliers from the freshmen class, statistically significant differences were found in the principled moral reasoning scores (P scores) of freshmen ($m = 22.146$, $sd = 12.002$) and juniors ($m = 30.274$, $sd = 13.165$). No significant differences were found in moral reasoning based upon personality types. The mean P score among faculty members was 34.02 ($sd = 15.25$). In response to the primary research question, it was determined student scores did show moral reasoning differences

consistent with the program goals. Conclusions reached in this study were limited because of the cross-sectional design. Further research is necessary before conclusions may be generalized beyond the sample.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

DIT.....	Defining Issues Test
DIT-2.....	Defining Issues Test 2
LSP.....	Louisiana State Penitentiary
MBTI.....	Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
NOBTS.....	New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary

CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CLARIFYING COMPONENTS

The Angola College Program

In 2004, the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola (LSP) was the nation's largest prison, housing more than 5,100 inmates. Every inmate was either convicted of a violent felony or classified as a habitual offender; the average Angola inmate was sentenced to 88 years (Frink, 2004; "Confronting recidivism," 2005). Of the inmates at LSP, 90% were expected to never leave the prison (Severson, 2004).

In the early 1990s, college programs existed in hundreds of prisons across the country. These programs relied heavily upon federal financial aid funding, such as Pell grants. Congress cut funding for prison education, however, in 1995 (Karpowitz & Kenner, n.d.). During the conservative attempts to restructure government, many lawmakers viewed tax funded prisoner education as a poor investment (Nelson, 1995).

When the federal government cut Higher Education Act funding for educational rehabilitation programs, Angola's Warden, Burl Cain, began thinking of new ways to educate prisoners (Frink, 2004). Partnering with the Judson Baptist Association, Louisiana Baptist Convention, and the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary (NOBTS), Cain brought a privately funded theological education to the prison (Baker, 2000).

In 1995, a partnership between NOBTS and LSP created a college program offering associate and bachelor's degrees to prison inmates. Associate degrees were first

awarded in 1998, and the first bachelor's degrees were awarded in 2000 (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2000). In 2004, LSP was the only prison in the United States offering college degrees to inmates (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2001). The LSP campus of NOBTS was one of 16 Seminary extension centers and was regionally accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (Frink, 2004).

In 1997, the program's capacity was just 50 students (Moore, 1997). There were 104 students enrolled in 2000 (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2000). By 2004, the program enrolled more than 120 students. Even with increased enrollment space available, the number of applicants exceeded the number of students the program was able to enroll (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, n.d.a). The popularity of the LSP Seminary was quite different than what Walsh (2000) had observed in other prisoner education programs. Walsh (2000) found prisoner education programs did not typically generate significant interest from prisoners.

Because the program had been sectarian in nature, admission required at least one year of active involvement in one of the prison's religious communities (Achord & Moore, 1998). While the Seminary was a Christian institution, Muslims had been admitted to the program. All LSP seminarians were required to possess a high school diploma or GED (Severson, 2004). The admission requirements were similar to those of students enrolled in the program on NOBTS's main campus.

Once admitted to the Seminary, each inmate had the option of earning an associate or bachelor's degree in Christian Ministry (Louisiana Department of Public

Safety and Corrections, n.d.b). Students attended classes full-time and enrolled in 15 hours per semester. The program had even expanded to allow students to perform internships served with previous Seminary graduates. To be eligible for internships, students must have been in the senior year of the bachelor's program. At the time of this study, Angola reportedly had 67 program graduates and interns around the prison (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, n.d.b).

Graduates were credited with having a positive impact on the prison community and had been involved in numerous churches (Moore, 1997). There was even a Christian radio station, JLSP 91.7, "Incarceration Station," within the prison. Because of the success, the Angola Seminary had begun sending missionaries to other prisons. The missionary program allowed graduates to leave the maximum security LSP and relocate for two years to another Louisiana correctional institution (Severson, 2004).

The LSP Seminary had been a pioneering effort. While many other correctional institutions had routinely offered religious programs, LSP was unique in offering bachelor's degrees, seminary degrees and in sending inmate missionaries to other institutions. With 90 inmate-missionaries, the program had been rather extensive (Severson, 2004).

A primary goal of the Seminary had been the moral development of students. Warden Cain had said, "I wish other prison wardens could realize what we learned—that the only rehabilitation is moral rehabilitation" (Frink, 2004, p. 39). Robert Toney, a chaplain at Angola, also emphasized the moral nature of the Seminary program in his statement that "moral rehabilitation is the only rehabilitation that works. If you just have

education, what you have done is just created a smarter criminal. The change must come from within” (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108).

Moral development had been an integral part of the NOBTS curriculum. The Seminary designed its curriculum around five “core values.” These values were doctrinal integrity, spiritual vitality, mission focus, characteristic excellence, and servant leadership (*Academic catalog*, 2005-2006, p. 2). According to Dr. Timothy Searcy, the Seminary’s Director of Institutional Effectiveness (personal communication, June 25, 2005), ethics had been a feature of each of the core values.

The Angola program was credited with creating social and moral change among the inmate population. In a prison where violence was an almost everyday occurrence in the 1990s, violence in 2005 was quite rare. While LSP was once known as the nation’s most dangerous prison, no murders had occurred there since 1999 (Baker, 2002). One inmate described the Seminary’s effect by saying, “I can now lay down at night and not worry about what my neighbor is going to do to me or anything like that” (Severson, 2004, paragraph 9).

According to Angola’s Chaplain Toney, Angola had transformed from “the most violent prison in America” to “the safest prison in America.” The frequency of violent crimes at LSP had shown a steady decline since the Seminary began its program. The rate of violence in Angola dropped by approximately 90% between 1996 and 2004 (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108). Murders and suicides completely disappeared from the prison (Baker, 2002). The safer atmosphere at Angola was compared to what Warden Cain remembered from a prior decade. “I was getting called every week when I

was first warden here. We had murders, we had escapes, we had suicides—loss of hope...” (Severson, 2004, paragraph 3). Speaking at a graduation of LSP seminarians, Dr. Chuck Kelley, NOBTS president, explained the moral underpinning of the Seminary’s mission in his statement that “God is willing to exchange our evil for his good” (Achord & Moore, 1998, paragraph 5).

The Louisiana Department of Corrections attributed much of the change at LSP to the Seminary. According to the Department website on rehabilitation and work programs, “The prison in its previous unhealthy condition was known for its violence and frequent escape attempts. Currently, Angola displays a peaceful and safe environment, which is the best evidence of a successful, healthy religious program” (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, n.d.b, paragraph 9).

Cain viewed faith-based efforts as the most promising development in criminal rehabilitation. He said, “nothing else but [the religious programs] should get the credit [for Angola’s change]. We always had the educational programs. The only thing we did different was we brought God to Angola” (Frink, 2002, p. 39). The program was considered such a success in 2004 that wardens from prisons in other states were asking NOBTS to consider opening campuses at their prisons (Myers, 2004). Later that year, NOBTS opened a new campus at the Mississippi State Penitentiary and the Seminary began developing programs in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama (Myers, 2005).

The creation and operation of the Angola Seminary was not easy. Some Louisiana legislators opposed the program (Frink, 2002). The American Civil Liberties Union challenged the program (Severson, 2004). Warden Cain was warned by other correctional

leaders the program would be dangerous. In describing the mindset of the correctional community, Cain said, “They told me that one inmate cannot have any power over another. Therefore he can’t preach or even lead a Bible study” (Frink, 2002, p. 37).

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary at LSP. Specifically, this study was designed to evaluate the program’s affect on the moral development of students at LSP. An attempt was made to include a census of all students in the LSP Seminary population.

The evaluation of the Seminary at LSP was important as national policy continued to emphasize faith-based initiatives and also led to the United States having the highest incarceration rate of any nation in the world (Mauer, 2003). The study of moral development was a salient issue for the American public as well (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma & Bebeau, 1999). From the frames of higher education, political science and criminal justice scholarship, this evaluation may help researchers, administrators, policy makers and bureaucrats make more informed and effective decisions. This evaluation may serve social scientists and philosophers in terms of advancing their understanding of the social, psychological and spiritual development of human beings.

Despite the relevance of this program to so many fields of scholarship, this researcher could not find any previously published studies concerning the Seminary at LSP. Searches were conducted through a variety of databases, including Dissertation Abstracts, ERIC, Professional Development Collection and Academic Search Premier.

Searcy (personal communication, June 25, 2005) confirmed no systematic evaluation had been conducted exclusively for the LSP Seminary program. This program evaluation stood to fill an important gap in scholarship.

According to the US Department of Justice, program evaluations could be classified as either process-based, or outcomes-based. A process-based evaluation aids stakeholders in understanding the program operation for the purpose of replicating the program. An outcomes-based evaluation is intended to determine whether the program is meeting its goals (U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). An outcomes-based program evaluation model was used for this study.

Primary Research Question

To what extent do students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry?

- a. What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary students?
- b. What, if any, statistically significant relationships exist between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types?

Methodology

Population

During the fall 2005 semester, the LSP Seminary program enrolled 101 students. Because the population was relatively small and the measurement instruments allowed groups to be evaluated at reasonable costs, the entire program population was invited to participate in the study. The DIT and DIT-2 required moderate reading levels (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). Consequently, the use of a control group was determined to be impractical. Appropriate reading levels could not be assured for any random group of prisoners outside the college program.

While an attempt was made to include a census of the population, all participants were informed of their rights, including the right to not participate. Particular care was taken to practice informed consent consistent with the Common Rule subsection on research involving prisoners (45 CFR 46, subpart C).

In addition to the involvement of the program population, moral judgment data were gathered from full-time faculty of NOBTS. The data gathered from the faculty was used in conjunction with program population data for the purpose of better addressing the Research Question. Faculty data served as a benchmark for student moral development.

At the time this study began, a census of the 66 full-time faculty members was planned, with the actual sample to be dictated by voluntary participation with informed consent. Hurricane Katrina, however, caused the evacuation of the NOBTS main campus. Most of the faculty who served in administrative roles (e.g., deans) relocated to continue

work in Atlanta, GA. The remaining faculty members were dispersed throughout the country.

As a result of the faculty diaspora, a census of faculty was determined to be impractical for this evaluation. Consequently, a sample was selected consisting of the 15 administrative faculty members in Atlanta and 15 randomly selected non-administrative faculty members.

The inclusion of faculty was chosen for three primary reasons. First, the lack of a control group limited the conclusions that may have been reached from this study. A benchmark group was not the same as a control group but provided some external measure. Second, Kohlberg found the moral reasoning of teachers directly impacted the moral development of students (Bar-Yam, Kohlberg, & Naame, 1980). An evaluation of faculty moral reasoning served to ascertain what level of moral reasoning was consistent with the program's intended outcomes. The third rationale for including faculty followed from the second rationale. An evaluation of the moral reasoning of faculty, who presumably represented the highest levels of moral reasoning in Baptist theology, served as a tool for validating the DIT-2 for this study.

Instrumentation

The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator[®] (MBTI[®]) Form F instrument were administered to participants. The DIT-2 (Rest et al., 1999) was an updated and shortened version of Rest's (1979a) Defining Issues Test (DIT), which was a written assessment based on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview

(MJI) (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Liberman, 1983). The DIT had been used for more than two decades, and researchers had accumulated results for more than 500,000 participants (Rest et al., 1999).

Form F of the MBTI instrument was the longer research version of the instrument and consisted of 166 items. The Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT), producer of Form F, authorized that form for external researchers whose research was related to concurrent CAPT research plans. This researcher contacted CAPT and was approved to use Form F.

Both the DIT-2 and MBTI measurement tools were based upon extensively evaluated theories and had been used for assessments within religious communities, correctional systems and college programs (Good & Cartwright, 1998; Griffore & Samuels, 1978; King & Mayhew, 2002; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 2003; Rest, 1986; Rest et al., 1999; Sandhu, 1997/1998; Watt, Frausin, Dixon & Nimmo, 2000; Young, Cashwell & Woolington, 1998). The DIT-2 was considered especially valuable for assessing moral development affect in professional educational programs (Rest et al., 2000).

Reliability and Validity

DIT Reliability and Validity

The evidence for a cognitive theory of moral development was so strong Rest (1986) believed, “if a person remains skeptical on the point that there are age trends in

moral judgment, it is doubtful that any finding in all of social science will be acceptable” (p. 29, 32). One of the fundamental validity traits in Kohlberg’s theory was that numerous studies had shown stage-progression is age-related. Similarly, early research of the DIT supported its ability to measure moral development as a factor of cognitive maturation. According to Rest (1986), “age/education accounts for 30 to 50 percent of the variance in DIT scores” (p. 176). So, the general theory of a cognitive basis for moral development was well supported.

Researchers had found the DIT was sufficiently reliable, with reliability coefficients usually in the .70s and .80s (Rest et al., 2000). The original version of the DIT had an internal reliability, using Chronbach’s alpha, of .76, while the shorter DIT-2 increased reliability to .81. Combing the DIT and DIT-2 increased reliability to .90, but did not yield significantly different results The reliability and validity of the DIT and DIT-2 were based upon hundreds of thousands of administrations. The DIT and the DIT-2 correlated extremely well with each other (Rest et al., 1999).

The DIT and DIT-2 include several internal methods for protecting reliability and validity. For example, DIT score reports include an M score, or Meaningless score.

A number of meaningless but complex-sounding items are interspersed throughout the DIT. If too many of these items receive top ranking by a subject, we infer that the subject is not attending to meaning, and consequently invalidate that subject’s questionnaire. We also have an internal consistency check in the DIT to determine if subjects are randomly responding without attending to any item feature. (Rest, 1986, p. 197)

More than 400 studies have been used to validate the DIT in terms of cognitive measurement, longitudinal consistency, age and educational discrimination, reliability

and other measures of professional ethics and social issues. Still, the developers of the DIT sought to gather more data, especially data pertaining to demographic groups most salient to the DIT construction and theory. More research was needed into moral development in professional education and specific moral dilemmas could be devised to measure the moral concerns within various professions (Rest et al., 1999). Because this study concerns the professional preparation of clergy, this research provided valuable contributions to the research literature.

According to Rest (1986), a large percentage of studies involving the DIT used small sample sizes and have often involved no more than a couple dozen participants (Rest, 1986). Literature reviewed for this dissertation included numerous studies with small sample sizes. Many of the studies included fewer participants than the number of participants who will be invited to participate in this research. Faqua (1983) investigated moral judgment among 111 Christian college students. Ang (1989) studied 41 Bible college students. Leeland (1990) studied 12 people in an experimental group and 13 people in a control group. Nelson (2004) used the DIT with a sample of just 56 Bible college students. Blizard (1980) investigated differences in moral reasoning among members of various denominations. Blizard's entire sample was comprised of just 115 church members. Catoe (1992) investigated MBTI and DIT results among 92 college students. Watt et al. (2000) included only 22 female prisoners as their primary participants. Finally, another study in a prison population included just 30 participants (Griffore & Samuels, 1978).

Some studies used negligibly larger sample sizes. Washington (1999) used the DIT with 149 college students. Warren (1992) included 183 Christian college and high school students, as well as 167 public school students. Hoagland (1984) used a sample size of 154 in a study comparing conservative Christians with liberal Christians and nonreligious participants. A study of Catholics who volunteered to teach religion included 224 participants (Walters, 1980).

This study involved a population of 101 students. The size of the population was appropriate for the DIT instrument and was expected to yield reliable and valid statistics. Chapter 2 contains a literature review supporting the theoretical validity of the DIT-2 to this particular evaluation.

The DIT has been used with Christian populations in numerous studies. Quite often, Christian populations scored at approximately the national average. Many other studies have shown Christians to score below average. Christian education programs, however, have frequently intended to develop the critical thinking skills consistent with the principled reasoning measured by the DIT-2. The DIT-2 was not a perfect measure of Christian morality, as it was not designed for Christians, but the DIT-2 did meet the validity requirements to serve in this dissertation. Further, the DIT was the most appropriate measure available for this research.

MBTI Reliability and Validity

The MBTI was a time-tested instrument with high reliability and validity. Internal reliability coefficients for middle-aged adults exceeded .90 for each of the 4 dichotomies.

Test-retest reliabilities were lower but still ranged from the low .60s to low .80s. The psychological nature of the MBTI has caused the instrument to be susceptible to variations based upon testing conditions. Further, the certainty of type preference identifications has varied with each person and each dichotomy. The lack of certainty has caused some individuals to provide different results in test-retest assessments (Myers et al., 2003).

The validity of MBTI assessments has been evaluated by comparison with other psychological measures. For example, the MBTI dichotomies have been correlated modestly with corresponding dynamics of the 16 Personality Factors Questionnaire, the California Psychological Inventory and the Strong Interest Inventory (Myers et al., 2003).

The MBTI instrument, like the DIT-2, has been theoretically based in an assumption of universal applicability. Further, the MBTI instrument could not be used to report negative results. No score on an MBTI report could be construed as a bad or poor score. All personality type preferences were considered healthy aspects of human personality.

Despite the presumption of all types being equal, there were researchers who indicated type differences in moral reasoning. These findings actually supported the validity of both the MBTI and the DIT. Type differences in moral reasoning largely fit what investigators would have logically concluded based upon type and moral stage descriptions.

The type differences in moral reasoning bore significance on the interpretation of results from this study. Prior to the student assessments, the literature supported a

hypothesis that Introvert (I), Sensing (S), Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences would be overrepresented among LSP Seminary students. The S, F and J preferences were predictive of lower moral reasoning scores. The tendency of these types to predict lower moral reasoning did not negate the use of the DIT for this population. Instead, understanding these types allowed more valid type-appropriate interpretations of DIT scores.

Data Collection

Students in the LSP Seminary program received letters inviting them to participate in this study. The letters provided informed consent and requested their signatures indicating whether they agreed or did not agree to be a participant. Those students who agreed to participate were asked to complete the MBTI and DIT-2 instruments in a classroom setting at Angola.

Research involving prisoners was required to meet the requirements of Common Rule subpart C. To ensure LSP Seminary students did not feel any undue pressure to participate in this study, those students who attended received informed consent via letter and verbally from the researcher just prior to assessment. LSP guards were not in the classroom during the research process.

Each participant received an envelope containing the DIT-2 and the MBTI instruments. Each envelope was marked with a particular participant's name. The instruments, however, were only marked with each student's unique identification number created by the researcher for this dissertation. Participants completed the

instruments, the DIT-2, the MBTI, and the envelopes were each returned separately to the researcher. This method ensured the proper documents were provided to each student, but the documents, once completed, could not be identified with the individual student by anyone other than the researcher. Once the materials were returned to the researcher, no other person at Angola was provided access to the materials.

The research involving the full-time faculty at the NOBTS main campus was conducted in accordance with informed consent. The researcher originally proposed the Director of Institutional Research at NOBTS would distribute the informed consent letters, the DIT-2, and return envelopes to the faculty members at a regularly scheduled faculty meeting. The research plan was changed, however, as a result of Hurricane Katrina. The researcher delivered the materials to the offices of 15 NOBTS administrators who held faculty ranks and were working in the temporary NOBTS office in Atlanta, GA.

Because the New Orleans campus was closed for the fall 2005 semester and the operation of the Seminary was temporarily relocated to Atlanta, the Atlanta offices became the main campus. Those 15 faculty members constituted the entire full-time faculty at the NOBTS main campus. To increase the number of participants and provide data for faculty members not holding administrative roles, another 15 faculty members were randomly selected from those dispersed throughout the country. In total, 30 NOBTS faculty members were invited to participate. The faculty members were requested to complete the DIT-2 and return the instruments by mail to the researcher.

Data Analysis

For Research Question 1a, as to the existence of statistically significant differences in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level LSP Seminary students, data were analyzed using the DIT-2 P scores, stage scores and demographic information. The Center for the Study of Ethical Development provided DIT-2 results in an SPSS file. ANOVAs were used to investigate differences in dependent variables, which were the respective DIT-2 scores, and the independent variable, which was the taxonomy of class-year. Statistical significance was calculated based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5%.

For Research Question 1b, concerning statistically significant relationships between the moral judgment and personality types of LSP Seminary students, data were analyzed using the results from the DIT-2 and MBTI instruments. Moral judgment was categorized by P scores. Personality type independent variables included each of the 8 individual dichotomy designations (i.e., I, E, S, N, T, F, J and P), the 16 personality types (e.g., INTP), the 4 personality temperaments (i.e., SJ, SP, NT and NF) and Richardson's (1996) 4 spiritualities (i.e., NF, NT, SF and ST). ANOVAs were used to investigate differences in the dependent variable, the P score, and the independent variables. Statistical significance was calculated based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5%.

Data analysis for the single Primary Research Question, as to the extent to which students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry, was evaluated

with consideration of Research Questions 1a and 1b as well as faculty data. The analysis was designed to enhance and expand upon the quantitative data from the preceding Research Questions. The quantitative data found in the faculty DIT-2 results was synthesized with the findings from previous questions, in an attempt to evaluate the moral development of students in the LSP Seminary. The response to the Primary Research Question, therefore, presents the primary purpose of this evaluation of a faith-based program.

The research literature relevant to this program evaluation was limited in significant areas of content. Little research was available concerning the moral development of prisoners or the moral development of seminarians. While questions of statistical significance could be determined quantitatively, program success had not been defined quantitatively. Therefore, program success could not be fully understood quantitatively.

An evaluation of the program's effectiveness in facilitating moral development necessitated consideration of initial moral judgment and the moral judgment of exiting students, as well as the general progress shown across each year of schooling. Additionally, an evaluation of the moral development of students included the subjective assessment of growth respective of personality. Finally, a program evaluation necessitated consideration of what moral judgment was reasonable and appropriate for this population. The results of faculty evaluations facilitated creating a benchmark for what moral judgments were consistent with the program goals and Baptist theology.

Significance of the Study

There was considerable social and scholarly interest expressed in faith-based initiatives, correctional rehabilitation and moral development. This study was intended to contribute to a variety of highly salient issues. In particular, this study may serve to assist: (a) the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary to improve their program through empirical evaluation, (b) local and federal legislators to make better policy decisions about faith-based, correctional and educational programs and (c) educators to better understand the moral development of students.

A 2005 Congressional hearing was held to investigate the role of faith-based initiatives in prison reform, and Angola's program was a significant topic ("Confronting recidivism," 2005). The Seminary model had recently been expanded to the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, MS. NOBTS had also been in discussion with the states of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama, each of which had been considering creating seminary programs in their prisons. Moody Bible Institute of Chicago had also been building on the NOBTS model and was negotiating with the state of Illinois to begin a college program in Illinois prisons ("Confronting recidivism," 2005).

An investigation of this program had the potential to contribute tremendously to social science and policy. According to Rest (1974), any program that could result in even modest moral gains among the "extremely problematic" population of prison inmates would be "spectacular" (p. 250). Unfortunately, moral development research involving prisoners was quite rare.

The need for research-based evidence for education's impact on prisoner development provided reason to investigate the effect education has on Angola inmates. According to Everhart (1992), "education is credited with developing one's ability to think to become responsible for individual actions. This last concept is most meaningful when dealing with criminal offenders. . . (p. 5).

The evaluation of this program was also important for the continuing political and social discussion of social justice. Faith-based prison reform may be particularly promising for the black community, which was dramatically overrepresented among the prison population ("Confronting recidivism," 2005).

Evidence of program success may be vital for the long-term growth and support of prison education. The federal government cut funding for college education in prisons because such funding was deemed a poor use of limited resources. The demonstration of program success may be important to the government's future support for faith-based initiatives. Further, evidence of program success may be a step toward changing the correctional culture that discourages wardens from pursuing reform.

The Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance implemented the Intensive Program Evaluation (IPE) Initiative to gather data on effective efforts to reform the criminal justice system (U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997). The Department of Justice expected to use research to help bureaucrats make better decisions about justice reform. While IPE was specifically charged with gathering and disseminating data regarding programs funded by federal grants, this program evaluation was relevant to the IPE agenda.

One impediment to prison reform had been the system of evaluating prison wardens. According to Chaplain Toney, wardens were evaluated based upon the security at their prisons rather than rehabilitation outcomes. A warden who prevented riots and violence was considered a good warden regardless of the recidivism of released inmates. Such a system encouraged wardens to adopt stringent control policies and discouraged risk-taking, such as the creation of college programs. A college program relinquished some control of prisoners to the college faculty. Additionally, allowing college faculty and staff into the prison increased the risk of contraband being smuggled into the prison. Under the evaluation system, one warden admitted recidivism was not a warden's concern. "If that prisoner walked out of prison 1 block and raped and murdered somebody, that was still OK because they hadn't done it on his watch" ("Confronting recidivism," 2005, p. 125).

Limitations of the Study

This study was limited in several important ways. The DIT-2 was designed to assess only moral judgment, which was only one aspect of morality (Bebeau, Rest & Narvaez, 1999). For example, the ability to make moral decisions does not necessarily predict one will act according to such decisions. Further, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, there was tremendous debate about what it meant to be moral. The DIT was based in one particular theoretical system.

This study's inclusion of the MBTI assessment was an attempt to understand the affect personality may have had on moral development. Chapter 2 includes research

demonstrating the findings from similar research. It should be noted, however, that many other variables not accounted for in this study may have affected moral development. Therefore, the results of this study, as all studies, are tentative.

This study was a one-time, cross-sectional study. More research, such as longitudinal studies, would be beneficial in validating or refining the results of this study. This evaluation was a beginning evaluation and should serve as an impetus for further research.

Organization of the Study

This dissertation is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 consists of an introduction to the study, including the background of the program, purpose of the study, and research to be conducted. Chapter 2 details a review of literature pertinent to the study. Literature related to moral judgment, education, personality types and theology was reviewed. In Chapter 3, the methodology of this study is presented, including the Research Questions and conducted statistical measures.

Chapter 4 presents the analysis of data and results for each of the Research Questions. Chapter 5 consists of the conclusions reached based on the present research, a synthesis of findings from previous research and this study, as well as delineation of unanswered questions and suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND RELATED RESEARCH

What is Morality?

According to Rest (1986), “The function of morality is. . . optimizing mutual benefit of people living together in groups” (p. 1). Rest borrowed from Rawls’s (1971) statement, “It is morality’s special province...to provide guidelines for determining how the benefits and burdens of cooperative living are to be distributed...” (as cited in Rest, 1986, pp. 1-2). Ethics, which was identified synonymously with morality, consisted of two subcategories: meta-ethics and normative ethics. Meta-ethics consisted of the philosophical study of ethics or asking questions about ethics. Normative ethics consisted of the involvement in ethical conduct or developing policies and principles for ethics (Singer, 1994).

Throughout history, philosophers have debated what constitutes the moral decision, how morality may be evaluated, and how morality may be developed among people. One of the foremost theories of moral development and measurement is that of Kohlberg (1958). Kohlberg (1982) identified his theory as deontological (e.g., Kantian), as opposed to teleological (e.g., utilitarian). A deontological ethical system evaluates morality based on a presupposition that certain truths exist in the moral realm (e.g., lying is wrong). A teleological system bases moral decisions on a presupposition that the outcomes are the basis for judgment (Aron, 1977). Kohlberg (1973) traced the

development of his own deontological justice orientation through the works of Kant and Rawls.

Kohlberg was a developmental psychologist and formed his theory from the scientific, developmental perspective. His system juxtaposed ethical decisions made on the basis of rules with decisions based upon principles. According to Singer (1994), ethics includes “values” and “rules” (p. 11). Values allow various choices that fall within ethical boundaries. Rules are either obeyed or disobeyed. An example of a rule is to not kill people. An example of a value is charity. Kohlberg (1981) defined the difference as one of options.

To be honest [is a rule and] means ‘Don’t cheat, don’t steal, don’t lie....’ But justice is not a rule.... It is a moral principle. By a moral principle, I mean a mode of choosing that is universal...that we want all people to adopt in all situations.... There are exceptions to rules, but no exceptions to principles. (p. 39)

Psychology of Morality

Piaget

Piaget was one of the first moral philosophers to work from a scientific perspective. In interviewing children about justice, Piaget (1965) found responses fit into four categories: “Behavior that goes against commands received from the adult.... Behavior that goes against the rules of the game.... Behavior that goes against equality.... Acts of injustice connected with adult society (economic or political injustice)” (pp. 313-314).

According to Piaget (1965), these four categories create stages of progression from infancy through adolescence. The fourth stage moves beyond simple concepts of equality of outcomes into the concepts of “equity.” “In the domain of distributive justice it means no longer thinking of a law as identical for all but taking account of the personal circumstances of each [individual]” (p. 317). “The motto ‘Do as you would be done by,’ thus comes to replace the conception of crude equality. The child sets forgiveness above revenge, not out of weakness, but because ‘there is no end’ to revenge...” (p. 323).

Piaget’s (1965) groundbreaking work on the physical, social and psychological development of children became a foundation for developmental theories, such as Kohlberg’s. Piaget developed a theory that children progress linearly through four stages of maturation. Moral development, in particular, was a progressive understanding of justice. The first two stages occur in early childhood, until about the age of 7 or 8, at which time stage 3 begins. Stage 4 begins in adolescence.

Kohlberg

Kohlberg (1966) used interviews of boys to further develop Piaget’s theory. In Kohlberg’s theory, people progressed through three major steps, with each step including two stages, for a total of six stages. He named the first step preconventional, or premoral. The second step was the conventional stage. The final step was postconventional. Each step involved a deeper and broader understanding of moral decision-making.

In various works, Kohlberg defined his theories through different contexts. For example, Kohlberg (1973) once used the concept of personal rights to define each moral

stage. In another work, Kohlberg's (1981) moral theory was defined through the rationale a person gives for respecting the human rights of other people. In small children, at stage 1, people had no value for the rights of others. Very young children understood that some people were able to make claims on other people because of strength. The stronger person could control the weaker person. Power defined all relationships.

As toddlers, people began to learn forms of manipulation. In stage 2, other people were seen as objects to be used for personal gain. Toddlers did not necessarily understand the personal needs and desires of parents. What the toddler understood was that certain actions can cause the parents to behave in particular ways (Kohlberg, 1981).

Stage 3 began in middle childhood at a time when social relationships were paramount. Human rights, therefore, became an issue of maintaining close social relationships. Children did not want to hurt other people because such actions cause pain, embarrassment and isolation. Most adults could be classified as either stage 3 or stage 4 (Kohlberg, 1981).

People in stage 4 have moved beyond merely thinking only of individual relationships and have begun making moral decisions with consideration toward society, as a whole. According to Kohlberg (1981), for the stage 4 thinker, "life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties" (pp. 19-20). Kohlberg's stage 4 included moral decisions made through the confines of any system of social order, whether government law, or religious law. The key to this level was the subjection of individuals to the established order.

Kohlberg (1981) and Kohlberg and Ryncarz (1990), considered most Christians to exist at stage 4, and in fact, considered Christianity to be a stage 4 system. To describe human life as valuable because people are created in God's image was stage 4 thinking because the value relies on an external legitimacy. Even though such a view was universal, the reliance on God's decree made the philosophy a law and order philosophy (Kohlberg, 1981).

The postconventional stages included stages 5 and 6. These stages were abstract in nature, and most adults were not abstract moral thinkers. In stage 5, "life is valued both in terms of its relation to community welfare and in terms of life being a universal human right." Stage 5 moral philosophies included social contract theories and utilitarianism. In stage 6, "human life is sacred—a universal human value of respect for the individual" (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 19-20).

Stage 5 was abstract in its definition of universal human rights. Like stage 4, the value of humanity was somewhat arbitrary. Laws were different from one country to another. Therefore, stage 4 was based on an arbitrary value. Social contracts differ across time and place, and utilitarian ethics differ with each situation. The universal aspect of stage 5 rested in the determination that social contracts and utilitarianism were impartial systems. Under a social contract, laws were applied to everyone equally (Locke, 2000/1690). In a utilitarian system, each person's worth was no greater or less than any other person's worth (Mill, 2002/1861).

Kohlberg believed stage 6 was the highest level of moral development. In stage 6 thinking, "the worth of the individual human being is central where the principles of

justice and love are normative for all human relationships.... Stage 6 people answer in moral words such as *duty* and *morally right* and use them in a way implying universality, ideals and impersonality” (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 22). In other words, stage 6 thinkers had moved beyond the self-centered concerns of children, the social order focus of the legalists, and the arbitrary decisions of social contract theorists and utilitarians. The stage 6 thinker had expanded the universal aspects of stage 5 from universal within current society to universal across time and place. The stage 6 thinker was committed to universal application of principles.

The scientific approach Kohlberg (1981) used to assess moral development was based largely on Piaget. His work was not solely based in biological development, however. He was significantly influenced by philosophical thinkers, such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Rawls, and Dewey. It was through such philosophy that Kohlberg came to focus his research and his theory on the concept of justice. “I cannot define moral virtue at the individual level, [so] I have tried it at the social level and found it to be justice...” (p. 39).

Kohlberg’s (1958) theory was developed from interviews he conducted for his doctoral dissertation. He eventually developed the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), which was a structured interview, conducted by trained interviewers (Colby et al., 1983). Each participant was asked a series of moral dilemmas, such as the famous Heinz dilemma. The Heinz dilemma asked what action a man should take when his wife is dying of a curable disease, but the man cannot afford the medicine.

The responses participants provided for moral dilemma questions were scored by comparing them to the types of responses characteristic of each moral stage. The MJI required significant time by researchers. Each interview lasted approximately 45 minutes. Additional time was required for interpretation (Colby et al., 1983; Kohlberg, 1981).

The Defining Issues Test was developed by Rest (1979a) as an adequate substitute for the MJI because the resource requirements of the MJI were so significant. While the DIT was initially intended to be an adequate substitute for the MJI, Rest and his colleagues refined the DIT and its theoretical basis to the point where they deemed the DIT to be superior to the MJI (Bebeau & Thoma., 1999 May; Narvaez, Bebeau, Thoma, & Rest, 1999; Rest et al., 2000; Rest et al., 1999).

Philosophy of Morality

Kant

Many moral philosophers would divide the world into the time before Kant, and the time since Kant (Ferre, 1951). Kant's system of ethics (1994b) was a major work of the Rationalist era. He based his work on presuppositions of human rationality, impartiality and goodness. The philosophy that dominated Western liberalism before Kant was natural law theory. Kant differed from the natural law theorists in that he believed in an innate goodness of people, which allows people to independently pursue and reach the truth (Schneewind, 1992).

Kant's view of society was influenced by Rousseau's (1762/1988) social contract theory, in which independent people willingly surrender some freedom to enter into a society that promotes justice through unanimously agreed upon obligations (Schneewind, 1992). Kant further developed Rousseau's theory by claiming the social contract would be based on universal principles of justice, not the majority opinion.

"Categorical imperatives" were to form the basis for universal ethical laws, according to Kant (1994b). Categorical imperatives were those obligations rational people would want to be universally applied. "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law," Kant wrote (p. 274). According to Kant, those who would consider suicide or living off welfare should consider the ramification if everyone committed suicide or became social parasites. Neither choice is ethical since it stands to reason universal application of such choices would lead to society's destruction.

Honesty was a moral obligation, according to Kant (1994b). If telling the truth results in another person's harm, the speaker has no fault, for he or she merely conveyed the truth. Kant used the example of a murderer who asks for information concerning his victim. Providing information does not necessarily involve the speaker in the crime. A speaker who lies, however, bears criminal culpability for any resulting harm, even if the lie was told with sincere intentions of protecting the victim. "To be truthful (honest) in all declaration, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency" (Kant, 1994a, p. 281). Kohlberg's (1981) claim there are "no

exceptions to principles” was an echo of Kant’s statement the principle of truth is “limited by no expediency.”

A “practical imperative,” in addition to the categorical imperative, was argued for by Kant (1994b). “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only” (p. 279). This view was similar to the Golden Rule (Kohlberg, 1982). The moral foundation for both Kant and Kohlberg was a principled belief that humans have innate worth.

In Kantian ethics, moral action is inspired by one’s own rational morality, without regard to external rewards or punishments (Schneewind, 1992). According to Kant (1994b), any act motivated by hope of a reward fails to be moral because of its selfish motive. Ferre (1951), however, contends Kant, and numerous subsequent ethicists, have defined morality and justice too narrowly. While narrow definition of a field is required for modern academic scholarship, the practical effect is that ethicists have ignored the contributions of the other fields offering insight into their work. Kant’s views on reward, for example, have no place for many insights of behavioral and social psychology.

Kant considered religious faith to be important to moral development, but he conceived of religion in a transcendental and agnostic fashion. Kant insisted he, himself, was religious and that religion was indispensable to society. His religion, however, was similar to his politics. Both religion and politics, in Kant’s mind, were constructs intended to foster individual development. Because development could only come through reason, both institutions were to be ultimately focused on reason (Wood, 1992).

The philosophy of Kant was based in human rationalism and personal autonomy. Kant viewed acceptance of the divine will to be “heteronomy,” not autonomy (Schneewind, 1992, p. 316). Heteronomy was an individual’s subjection of his or her own reason to externally created judgments. Autonomy was to use one’s own reason for making judgments.

An individual’s obligation to others is a central feature of Kant’s philosophy. Kant viewed charity as, at best, a necessary evil. He thought anyone who depended on charity was a slave to the good will of the charitable giver. For this reason, Kant viewed the concept of obligation as superior to charity. Only when one could demand specific action from others could one be free from the whims of others (Schneewind, 1992). This view is in significant contrast to the Christian theology of charity as a social good. Mutual obligation, in which one person may demand something from another, is not a significant feature of Christian theology. One may feel obligation to provide care to another, but not necessarily to demand care be given by another person for one’s self.

As Singer (1994) noted:

Kant’s assertion that the moral law is a law of reason was based on his own peculiar metaphysics. He saw human nature as eternally divided. On one side is our natural or physical self, trapped in the world of desires. On the other is our intellectual or spiritual self, which partakes of the world of reason from which the moral law derives. (p. 8)

Rawls

Kohlberg (1973) argued Rawls’s theory of justice was more articulate and developed than even that of Kant, and was quite superior to social contract theories.

Rawls (1957) was concerned with justice in institutions and not justice as individual moral action. That macro focus was similar to Kohlberg's assertion that he could not define individual moral action, but concluded justice is the hallmark of the moral system.

The theory of justice proposed by Rawls (1957) began on the premise all citizens were entitled to the maximum freedom that did not hinder the freedom of others, and any limitations on freedom must have had a utilitarian effect of maximizing the common good. Justice was defined in a legal sense. "Justice is the elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment...of a proper balance between competing claims (p. 653).

Individual freedom was viewed by Rawls (1971) as always the servant of the social structure. Whereas a libertarian viewed a worker's wages as the private contract between worker and employer, Rawls viewed wages as a systematic tool of social engineering. "An inequality [of pay] is allowed only if there is reason to believe that the practice with the inequality will work to the advantage of *every* party" (p. 654).

As a 20th century liberal, Rawls (1957) viewed equality and freedom in economic terms. He assumed any group creating a society would be a collection of rent-seeking factions, each trying to establish their own benefit. The result would be a moral, socialized system, in which equality is artificially created.

Kohlberg (1973) specifically identified Rawls's (1971) model of justice as the epitome of moral reasoning. Kohlberg made the caveat, however, that Rawls's social model was not necessarily the only social model, because principles can be applied in

different manners. Still, Kohlberg considered Rawls's theory of justice to be the most clearly and uniformly stage 6 moral system.

Rawls (1971) outlined one of the most significant rationales for modern liberal political theory. Under his system, social systems were to be evaluated through concepts of a veil of ignorance and a view from what he called the original position. His theory asked evaluators to imagine being placed in the original position, which is a pre-mortal state. Evaluators were given a certain amount of knowledge about societies; the knowledge, however, was limited by the veil of ignorance. The evaluators were told facts, such as the range of incomes within each society. The evaluators were not told, however, the percentiles of income distributions.

From the limited vantage point of the original position, the evaluators were to choose the society in which they would like to be born. The evaluators would not know whether they would be born rich or poor, male or female, healthy or sick, etc. Rawls's presumption was that people will assume the vantage point of the lowliest people in society, because they assume a significant chance exists they will be born in the worst circumstances. Such evaluators would choose the society that offers the most justice (i.e., security) for the meek. In other words, a socialized nation would be preferable to a more merit-oriented society.

Kohlberg (1973) believed a great quality of Rawls's original position/veil of ignorance was its applicability to both macro and micro-morality. He believed the system could be used to solve personal problems such as real life dilemmas as well as social issues such as social construction. One could use the system to decide whether to

personally give to charity, and whether to vote for universal healthcare, by asking the same question. The question to ask was what decision would make one more likely to choose that society from the vantage point of the original position.

A common criticism of Rawls's theory was the requirement that certain knowledge be available, while other knowledge was denied, to the decision maker. Kohlberg (1973) conceded the veil of ignorance required ignorance of certain probabilities, while requiring knowledge of other probabilities. He considered the ignored probabilities to be "morally irrelevant," however (p. 644). In fact, Kohlberg (1973) contended the selectively available information actually precludes non-moral issues, such as self-interest, from entering into the decision. It is the intentionally limited information, Kohlberg (1973) believed, that forced the issue to be entirely based on moral judgment.

Kohlberg

Justice was the epitome of moral reasoning, according to Kohlberg (1981). His early work was based largely on the philosophical work of Kant and Rawls (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). Kohlberg (1981) noted empirical studies were unable to identify stage 6 thinkers. Kohlberg's progressive model of stages 1 through 5 was developed by analysis of interviews. His stage 6 conception, however, was a theoretical derivative of liberal philosophy.

The development of justice reasoning was vital to the creation of a morally sufficient humanity, Kohlberg (1981) contended. Conventional reasoning was what led so

many Nazis to engage in horrendous acts. The Nazi excuse of following orders is a stage 4 rationale, which appeals to law (Kohlberg, 1966).

Religion was placed in stage 4 by Kohlberg (1966). His example of stage 4 religious rationalizing was an interviewee who said, “The doctor wouldn’t have the right to take life, no human has the right. He can’t create life, he shouldn’t destroy it.” Yet, Kohlberg also allowed a transcendent religiosity in stage 6.

By the law of society [the husband] was wrong but by the law of nature or of God the druggist was wrong and the husband was justified. Human life is above financial gain. Regardless of who was dying, if it was a total stranger, man has a duty to save him from dying. (p. 9)

So, while Kohlberg generally placed any appeal to religious law as stage 4 reasoning, such appeals could be stage 6 if they appealed to universal principles. To say, “God requires” was stage 4. To say, “justice requires” was stage 6. “Thus saith the Lord” was stage 4, while “Thus saith wisdom” was stage 6. Kohlberg’s interview format hinged on such semantics.

Stage 6 thinking was “to learn to make decisions of principle; it is to learn to use ‘ought’ sentences verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own” (Kohlberg, 1966 p. 22).

Principled Reasoning

Kohlberg (1973), in part, validated his theory by noting that every philosopher interviewed in his research reasoned at either stage 5 or stage 6, which are known as the post-conventional, or principled stages. He contended stage 6 is more developed, but he

did not adequately explain why many philosophers, educated in Kantian ethics, still chose stage 5. Aron (1977) noted that many of the most significant philosophies (e.g., social contract theory and utilitarianism) are more linked to stage 5 thinking than stage 6 thinking. Baier (1973), likewise, believed Kohlberg had failed to adequately differentiate stages 5 and 6. Kohlberg (1982) admitted, himself, to significant difficulty in definitively differentiating stages 5 and 6.

The concept of reversibility came to be the keystone of stage 6 thinking (Kohlberg, 1973). Reversibility exists when an actor would make the same decision if he or she were in the original position, a state in which the actor knows he or she will be in the situation, but not at which social post. For example, in Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma (Colby et al., 1983), an actor in the original position would know he or she would end up being Heinz, the wife or the druggist, but not know in which position he or she would be placed. In such an original state, under the veil of ignorance, the moral decision would be made because the actor would choose the decision best for the least benefited member of the group. Reversibility is the foundation of Rawlsian justice (1971) because in Rawls's system, a just outcome is that in which any member of society could be placed in the least benefited position and not feel mistreated.

Reversibility is seen as differentiating stage 6 from stage 5 because Kohlberg concluded many stage 5 theories (e.g., social contract) do not meet the standards of reversibility. For example, Adam Smith's (2003/1776) capitalism postulates universal principles of property rights. Smith believed property rights are universal principles and not based upon an arbitrary social contract. Smith's philosophy fails the stage 6 test of

reversibility, however. From an original position, many people would not choose a system that places them at the mercy of their own productivity. The 20th century move toward socialism was evidence of the irreversibility of capitalism. Again, Kohlberg (1981) and Rawls (1971) treated economic justice (i.e., security) as a keystone of socio-moral principles.

In stages 5 and 6, rights are common to all people, at least within the society, and each member of society is expected to defend the rights of all others. A difference between stages 5 and 6, however, is that in stage 5, rights are usually only those acknowledged by the social contract, while in stage 6, rights are universal and impose demands regardless of social acknowledgment (Kohlberg, 1973).

Kohlberg and Religion

According to Kohlberg (1982), the Christian concept of “Love your neighbor” was just as legalistic as “Do not kill” and “Do not steal.” He classified all three biblical standards as moral rules. In contrast, Kohlberg stated the biblical standard of “the golden rule” was as principled as Kantian and Rawlsian ethics. In Kohlberg’s view, the distinction was that rules prescribed “actions,” whereas principles provided “a method for making a choice” (p. 520).

Like Kant, Kohlberg (1981) treated religion as a social construct, which required the presupposition that religion was not true. Religion, then, was an arbitrary force of social formation; religion was an aspect of culture, like dress, language, and cuisine. This view led Kohlberg to the unavoidable claim that religion was independent of moral

development. He frequently referred to literature supporting his claim. In his later work, however, he came to include religion as a feature of moral development; still, he never came to view religion as more than supportive of morality (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). In fact, Kohlberg (1981) explicitly claimed religious education was almost worthless for moral development.

Alternative Views

The moral development model of Kohlberg was frequently criticized from a variety of perspectives. Some researches, such as Gilligan (1993), contested the interpretation of Kohlberg's research. Other writers, such as Bennett (1995), contested the philosophical bases for his theory.

Flanagan and Jackson (1987) criticized Kohlberg's theory as being too narrowly focused on the singular concept of justice. Some scholars (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Snarey, 1985) criticized Kohlberg's theory as being exclusive to liberal, Western concepts of individuality and justice. Joy (1986) criticized Kohlberg's notion of justice as too narrowly defined. While Kohlberg claimed to base his research in Piaget's concept of moral justice, Joy believed Piaget's justice was broader and more aligned with Judeo-Christian justice. Kohlberg was led, according to Joy, by "his own political biases...into obvious distortion of 'what is moral'" (p. 406).

Moral development was viewed by Hogan (1973) as a combination of social relationships and personal autonomy. During the course of his career, Kohlberg slowly evolved to allow more influence from culture and society. His early work was so based in

Kantian ethics that any reference to a social norm was considered conventional thinking (Kohlberg, 1967). His later work still emphasized individual autonomy, but began to allow that some moral principles could be influenced, or at least encouraged, by social morals (Kohlberg & Powers, 1981).

Kohlberg's inconsistency across time was a criticism of Reed (1997). According to Reed, Kohlberg's theory was based on a rationalist concept of self-created ethics. Kohlberg's Just Community pedagogy, however, relied on socially and democratically created ethics, as well as social norms and pressures to encourage adherence to principled morality.

The community, according to Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Powers, 1981), was an agent for supporting or inhibiting moral principles, rather than teaching moral principles. It was the supportive function, rather than instructive function, of the community Kohlberg (1981) insisted prevented moral judgment from being externally oriented. For many scholars, such as Reed (1997), the distinction was a semantic argument with little practical significance.

One of the most influential critics of Kohlberg was Gilligan. She argued Kohlberg's justice ethic was too narrowly focused and biased against care, which she contended, was the dominant ethic for women (1993/1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Rest (1986), however, claimed Gilligan's work was unsupported by the vast majority of research. According to Rest:

[Gilligan] did not actually do a systematic review of the moral judgment literature on sex differences before making the bold statement that justice-oriented scoring systems downgrade women.... Systematic reviews are now available....and the

results are unambiguous: it is a myth that males score higher on Kohlberg's test than females (p. 112)

Researchers using the DIT have also failed to replicate Gilligan's claim (Aronovitz, 1984; Denny, 1988; Taylor, 1992; Wahrman, 1980; Watt et al., 2000; Wright, 2001;).

The evidence for the gender neutrality and other aspects of validity of the Kohlberg model is evaluated later in this chapter.

Gilligan proposed care and justice orientations were not overarching moral frameworks. Rest (1986), however, asserted Gilligan's modified theory lacked support. "Although the care orientation is said to be an alternative and parallel path of moral development, there is not one longitudinal study or any cross-sectional data to support that claim" (p. 117).

Despite growing evidence against Gilligan's work, she was influential in the field of moral development theory. Kohlberg (1982) admitted Gilligan's work was a useful hypothesis, especially in its early phases, and helped him refine his own interpretations of interviews. In the long-term, however, Gilligan's work was not validated.

In general, researchers found no gender differences on Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. Women, however, were more likely to use care orientations when responding to a dilemma concerning surrogate parents. The emphasis on care among women was even greater among women in prison (Watt et al., 2000). This might have been an indication the care orientation was a lesser rationale and surfaced more when dilemmas elicited affective bias.

A pragmatic criticism of Kohlberg's stage 6 was offered by Henson (1973). The Kantian assertion that obligation is greater than charity is an integral part of stage 6. Hogan believed the moral claims of stage 6 reasoning were ill-defined because Kohlberg did not establish how one could determine which claims of a person were justifiably binding on others and which claims were ignorable self-interests.

Kohlberg's theory was criticized by Clouse (1985) who argued the conventional reasoning of stage 4 thinkers could actually be a healthy for society in balancing the change orientation and social upheaval of liberals. Clouse's work specifically addressed the Kohlberg's (1966) frequent assertion conservatives, whether religious or political, were less moral than liberals and posed the danger of Nazism.

Much of the debate concerning moral reasoning was a matter of defining what it meant to be moral and what caused or inhibited moral development. Early Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle and Socrates, disagreed with each other; Kant disagreed with the natural law theorists. There was no consensus in moral philosophy and the historical development of moral philosophy was rich and contentious.

Fowler

Fowler worked in conjunction with Kohlberg, but he conducted his research with a focus on the development of religious faith. Fowler believed faith was a prerequisite for stage 6 thinking because people needed some source for idealizing. According to Fowler, Kant and Kohlberg appealed to faith in their own abilities, whereas Christians appealed to faith in their theology (Wallwork, 1980). Wallwork, however, did not like Fowler's broad

definition of faith because it allowed for almost any belief not based in objective science to be faith.

Fowler modified Kohlberg's theory, based on the insistence morality and religion were incongruent, to combine religious faith development and moral development into parallel constructs (Wallwork, 1980). Fowler defined principled faith as deriving authority from "reflective" thought (Kohlberg & Power, 1981, p. 334).

Kohlberg generally viewed Christianity to be a blind, obedient faith. Hoge et al. (1982), however, claimed Baptists emphasize reflective thinking about their theology. Baptist theology, then, is consistent with the development of mature faith, and hence mature moral judgment. Grimley (1991) argued Kohlberg's stage 6 is contingent upon a developed religious belief. Further, Grimley found a relatively strong correlation of 0.75 between stage development in the DIT and Fowler's stages of faith development.

Other Research Instruments

Although this literature review focused on the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a review of other measurement instruments was conducted. There were numerous instruments available. The DIT was the most common, however, and was determined to be most appropriate for this research.

The Moral Justification Scale (MJS) was a paper and pencil test structured similarly to the DIT. The MJS, however, was designed to categorize participants according to justice or care moral orientations (Gump, Baker & Roll, 2000). As discussed earlier, the care framework was useful as a supplemental consideration, but was not

supported as an overarching theory. As an instrument, the MJS has a mediocre reliability of .64 on the justice orientation and .75 on the care orientation (Gump et al., 2000).

Reliability of the MJS was considerably lower than the DIT (Rest et al., 2000).

An excellent collection of instruments, and analyses of their uses, reliability and validity, may be found in Hill and Hood's *Measures of religiosity* (1999). Their collection included instruments for a variety of religious issues, such as faith, morality, commitment, and fundamentalism. Most instruments, particularly those of moral reasoning, have low reliability, in comparison to the DIT, and were not determined to have validity for this study.

Defining Issues Test

About the Defining Issues Test

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was created by Rest as a substitute for the Moral Judgment Interview (MJJ). The DIT was a written test presenting six moral dilemmas. Participants read each dilemma and then read twelve rationales for how to respond to the dilemma. The participant was asked to evaluate the relevance of each rationale and choose which rationales were most relevant. The various rationales were designed to represent varying stages of moral judgment. The DIT had several inherent and obvious advantages over the MJJ. The advantages include the ability to evaluate more participants, increased reliability across evaluations, and reduced costs (Rest et al., 1999).

The test was a paper-and-pencil test, which meant it could be administered to groups of people at one time. The MJI, on the other hand, required individual interviews with each participant. The administration of the DIT allows the evaluation of much larger samples (Rest et al., 1999).

The MJI required interviewers to be trained for the structured interview. Additionally, significant training was required for the evaluation and scoring of interview data. Every response given by a participant required evaluation for its fit with the moral stages. While the structure of the MJI allowed reasonable inter-rater reliability, the evaluations were still subject to human error. The DIT, on the other hand, was objectively scored. DITs could be scored via a scoring rubric or computer scored by the Center for the Study of Ethical Development, publisher of the DIT (Rest et al., 1999).

Substantial cost benefits were available to researchers using the DIT compared with those researchers using the MJI. The ability to administer to larger samples, and do so quickly, as well as score the results quickly, saved time and money. Evaluations of large programs could be conducted with much greater efficiency using the DIT (Rest et al., 1999).

After more than two decades in use, the DIT was recently revised. The new instrument was known as the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2). The new instrument was shortened to include only five dilemmas. Dilemmas were updated as needed. Additionally, a new statistic was created for the DIT-2 (Rest et al., 1999).

Four-Component Model

The theoretical basis for the DIT involved the Four-Component Model (Narvaez et al., 1999; Rest et al., 2000). The Four-Component Model divided morality into four categories: moral attention, moral judgment, moral motivation and moral virtue. Moral attention was the ability to recognize moral situations. A sociopath, for example, lacks moral attention. Moral judgment was the ability to choose the moral action that should be taken by an actor. Moral motivation was the internal desire to act according to moral standards. Finally, moral virtue was the personal determination to act morally, even when it would be most convenient to act immorally.

The DIT was designed to measure moral judgment, the second of the four components. Moral judgment requires moral attention, the first component. When someone is faced with a moral dilemma, such as provided in the MJI or the DIT, that person must recognize the moral features of the dilemma in order to provide a moral judgment. The DIT's focus on component two meant its results do not fully indicate a person's morality. For example, the DIT was not intended to predict what a person would do in a situation. The DIT merely measured what a person thought should be done in that situation (Rest, 1986). The DIT's construction was aligned with Kohlberg's view that moral judgment is a matter of what one 'ought' to do in the situation.

Rest and Moral Theory

Rest substantially refined Kohlberg's moral development theory, creating what he called the neo-Kohlbergian model. One change in the neo-Kohlbergian model was

Kohlberg's stages were refined into schemas. Specifically, Kohlberg's stage model was based on the insistence that every individual exists in a particular stage. Evolution from one stage to another was a punctuated action in which a person clearly changed from the lower stage to the higher stage. Like Kohlberg's stages, Rest's schemas followed the progressive, developmental pattern, and were also based on developmental psychology. Rest's schemas, however, allowed a more gradual transition across the range of moral development. In the newer model, the schemas were as follows: (a) Personal Interest (labeled S23), which correlates to Kohlberg's stages 2 and 3; (b) Maintaining Norms (S4), which correlates to stage 4; and (c) Postconventional (S56), which correlated to stages 5 and 6 (Narvaez et al., 1999; Rest, 1986).

The Four-Component Model was created by Rest (1986) to describe the process of moral action. The model consists of (a) rational decision-making, (b) moral evaluation, (c) moral choice, and (d) moral fortitude. According to Rest, this model was based upon "processes" and not "virtues" or personal "traits" (p. 5). Additionally, the cognitive process involved interplay of the components rather than stage procession.

The DIT is based on the premise that people at different points of development interpret moral dilemmas differently, and have different intuitions about what is right and fair in a situation.... These [intuitions] are not necessarily apparent to a subject as articulative rule systems or verbalizable philosophies—rather, they may work 'behind the scenes' and may seem to a subject as just commonsensical and intuitively obvious. (Rest, 1986, p. 196)

The behind the scenes function of the moral schemas was considerably different than Kohlberg's theory. In the MJI, interviewees were only scored according to the level they could clearly explain. It was not enough for an interviewee to say Heinz should do

some action. The interviewee must also have explained why that action was the moral choice. The expository requirement of the MJI required individuals to have a firmly established moral system in their own minds. The DIT, however, asked respondents to choose the most moral action. Respondents did not need to explain why that action was moral (Narvaez et al., 1999).

Respondents often scored higher on the DIT than the MJI. According to Rest (1986), the format of the instrument caused the difference in the scores. “Since subjects usually find recognition tasks (like the DIT) easier than production tasks (like the Kohlberg task), it is not too surprising that the DIT credits subjects with more advanced thinking than does the Kohlberg test” (Rest, 1986, p. 197). The DIT, in this view, was more valid in measuring moral judgment, because it was measuring cognition rather than verbalization.

The basic philosophical foundation for Rest’s theory was very similar to Kohlberg’s philosophy. According to Rest (1986), a concept of “fairness” was inherent in the mental paradigms of individuals, although the definition of fairness was relative to the individual’s level of cognitive moral development (p. 10). For example, in stage 2, Rest (1986) described fairness as, “direct exchange of favor for favor” (p. 10). Stage 3 entailed a fairness of “maintaining positive, long-term relationships...that I know I can count on you and that you can count on me....” (p. 10). Fairness in stage 4 was defined in terms of the solidarity of the greater society which relied on the general willingness of people to submit to the law.

Individuals automatically used their personal definition of fairness when making moral choices. Rest (1986) used the Heinz dilemma to illustrate the interaction of “fairness” in moral decision-making. According to Rest, someone at stage 4 would consider the possibility of Heinz stealing in terms of what social consequences might result from theft. A person at stage 4 might ask what would happen if everyone chose to steal when they were in need. The stage 4 thinker might conclude that while Heinz’s wife should not needlessly die, rampant theft could damage society.

One variation Rest (1986) made to Kohlberg’s theory was an allowance for greater social construction of moral principles. While Kohlberg gradually incorporated greater acceptance of social power, such as the Just Community pedagogy, his foundation in Kant always made him leery of groupthink. Kohlberg had referenced the Nazis as an example of the danger in following society.

Rest disagreed with Kohlberg’s comparison of law and order with Nazi culpability. Rest believed the key to developmentally valuable social norms was a society open to discussion and the free exchange of ideas. Rest wrote:

Morality that is relative to group deliberation is not tantamount to the mindless moral relativism or moral skepticism that Kohlberg feared, nor does it pave the way to Nazi atrocities. Common morality might be different for different communities (and therefore relative), but the common morality is debated and scrutinized by members of the community and reflects an equilibrium between the ideals and the moral intrusions of the community. (Rest et al., 2000, p. 385)

Morally productive societies do not merely prescribe law, but debate law and evolve law. The theoretical foundation of Rest’s theory and the DIT were validated by researchers who have investigated correlations between P scores and corresponding social principles.

If the DIT accurately measured one's understanding of abstract human values, such as the rights to life, free expression and liberty, then the DIT should correlate reasonably well with instruments that specifically measure attitudes toward those issues.

Getz (1985) found participants with high levels of principled moral reasoning were moral likely to score high on a measure of support for controversial human rights issues, lending support for the idea that moral reasoning scores indicate a factor in one's social thought. Similarly, Blizard (1980) found a significant relationship between moral reasoning (DIT) and one's commitment to humanitarianism.

DIT and Colleges Students

The DIT has been used in thousands of studies involving college students. According to Rest's (1986) review of education program evaluation literature, "the overall power of moral education programs taken together without regard to type of program is statistically significant, but is, according to Cohen, in the small range" (p. 79). In that analysis, Rest considered programs that were specifically aimed at moral development and measured using the DIT. Consequently, his programs were all one semester or less, usually much less, in length. Rest focused his review on such short programs to provide a reasonable limit to his research.

The program being evaluated in this dissertation was an entire college curriculum. Rest (1986) described four general types of educational programs evaluated for moral judgment effect They are (a) "moral dilemma" discussions, (b) "personality development," (c) traditional academic programs not directly teaching moral judgment,

and (d) “short-term” programs (p. 80). Rest (1986) found moral dilemma and personality development programs analyzed using this method yielded small effect sizes, while academic and short-term programs had no effect. Because Rest (1986) focused on literature concerning targeted moral education programs, he limited his review of literature regarding entire four-year college programs. There was a plethora of literature available, however, on college evaluations using the DIT. Some of that research was briefly addressed by Rest (1986).

Educational program literature was evaluated by Rest (1986) who found college students generally showed small gains (average effect size of .28) from moral development programs. In one study of a two year nursing program, students did not show any advance in moral reasoning (Aronovitz, 1984). One excellent literature review concerning the DIT and college education, overall, was conducted by Pascarella and Terenzini (1991). They concluded college programs were substantially related to increases in levels of moral reasoning. Overall, education accounted for approximately half of the variance in moral judgment scores (Bebeau et al.; 1999; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991; Rest, 1986).

DIT and Christians

The program evaluated in this dissertation was a distinctively Christian college program. The DIT has been used extensively for studies of Christian populations, in both educational and noneducational contexts. While the DIT was generally accepted as a valid instrument for moral evaluation in secular settings, there were some researchers

who doubted its validity for Christian populations. In Chapter 3, the validity of the DIT for this program is elaborated in detail. This section provides a general review of literature concerning Christians.

Religion was irrelevant to moral development, according to Kohlberg (1981). In fact, he claimed his theory was universally applicable to all populations. A number of critics, however, questioned his claims. Rest (1986) analyzed 24 studies concerning Christians and found Christians usually scored slightly below average, or at the average. He concluded the literature generally supports the use of the DIT with Christian populations.

The difficulty in reviewing literature concerning Christians is differentiating research by definitions of Christianity. Some researchers categorized Christians by self-identification. Some researchers categorized Christians through church membership or religious activity. Other researchers categorized Christians through the use of measures of religiosity.

Some researchers have not found religiosity to be a significant factor in moral development. Wahrman (1981) studied college students of various religions and found religion to be unrelated to moral judgment. Religion accounted for a mere 5% of the variance of DIT P-scores in a study by Dickinson and Gabriel (1982). Similarly, Radich (1982) studied religious youth and found no significant differences based upon religion (as cited in Rest, 1986). In a primary study of the DIT2, Rest et al. (1999) investigated 200 participants, who were categorized into four groups. One group consisted of graduate students and included 13 seminarians. Unfortunately, Rest et al. reported the seminarians'

scores as part of a larger group of professional school students, so data particular to the seminarians were unavailable for this literature review.

A particularly interesting study of Christians was conducted by Nelson (2004). Nelson found that while biblical literacy was related to higher P scores, those moral scores were still underreporting the moral thinking of Bible college students. The students were frequently responding favorably to stage 4 and stage 6 reasoning, but were rejecting stage 5. Nelson suggested studies among religious populations might be more accurate if scores for individual stages were also considered.

Christians may be unwilling to adopt stage 5 reasoning, while they willingly adopt stage 6, because the social construction of stage 5 ethics is inconsistent with biblical views of human sinfulness (Nelson, 2004). The universal and cosmic nature of stage 6 does not have the human-created proposition of stage 5.

In a longitudinal study over four years of college, Shaver (1984) found results similar to those of Nelson. Bible college students significantly decreased their use of reasoning at stages 2 and 3, while they increased their reasoning at stages 4 and 6. There was no significant change in stage 5 reasoning. The Bible college students were more likely to choose reasoning at stages 4 or 6 than liberal arts college students.

The social contract/utilitarian features of stage 5 inherently contain two factors that may be incompatible with some Christians' theology. First, stage 5 reasoning, according to Kohlberg, understood morality as arbitrary and socially constructed. Second, stage 5 reasoning supposed human commitment to the social structure was paramount. Rousseau's (1988/1762) advice that religion and government be tools of social cohesion

exemplified such humanistic philosophy. Stage 6, on the other hand, presupposes pre-existent and universal values. While Kohlberg did not contend stage 6 values were theocentric, stage 6 at least allowed a theology of divine preexistence. Stage 5 thinking was more theologically oriented toward the clock-maker theology, in which God exists but exerts no influence.

Bible college students were found by Nelson (2004) to prefer stage 6 reasoning over stage 5 reasoning. Nelson supported Richards's (1991) earlier findings that Christians frequently used stage 6 reasoning, but rejected the social contract aspects of stage 5 reasoning. Because P scores were comprised of the combination of stage 5 and 6 responses, Christians P scores were below national norms. In Nelson's study, the mean P score among Bible college students were 35.17 (sd = 11.69). McNeel (1994) found Bible college seniors had a mean P score of 37.96 (sd = 14.52) (cited in Nelson, 2004).

Because Christians may not have been fully evaluated by P scores alone, Nelson (2004) recommended researchers give consideration to variations in the scores for each stage of moral judgment. While P scores were the focus of most DIT research, the statistical reports from the DIT also included the percentage of time a respondent preferred a rationale from each moral stage. Investigating these preferences for each individual stage allowed researchers to see particular stage preferences, such as stage 6 over stage 5, which were not included in P scores.

The hypothesis that Christians may have preferred to skip stage 5 also had important ramifications for interpreting data of college-aged populations. It was during college that most adults began to contemplate the abstract and philosophical bases for

principled reasoning. If non-Christians easily adapted to stage 5, they would have appeared to progress more quickly than Christians. Such a trend might have led researchers to conclude Christianity was negatively related to principled reasoning. If it was true, however, that Christians preferred stage 6 more frequently than non-Christians, the long-term result may have been that Christians more frequently attained the highest stage of moral reasoning. The long-term benefit may not have appeared in studies of Christian college students, and may not have been noticed in studies utilizing only the common P score.

Some researchers have studied moral judgment as an outcome of theology. Childerston (1985) found students rated as fundamentalists were likely to score at stage 4, while students who did not fit the fundamentalist category were likely to score at stage 6. Copeland (1994) studied 242 Christian college students and found students with more fundamentalist theology scored lower on moral reasoning, using the DIT, than Christians who were not categorized as fundamentalists. There was a slightly negative correlation ($r = -.13$) between scores on a measure of religious fundamentalism and principled reasoning (Rest et al., 1999).

Fundamentalist theology was defined in the cited studies according to the believer's commitment to authority, tradition and/or literalism. Because Kohlberg and Rest both asserted that moral judgment is an outcome of personal reflection and cognitive dissonance, an inverse relationship between fundamentalism and moral judgment should be expected from fundamentalism, thusly defined.

Researchers have also investigated the religious motivation of individuals as an affect on moral development. Blizard (1980) found a significant relationship between moral reasoning and internal, as opposed to external, sources of religious authority. Blizard also found a relationship between P scores among Christians and moral abstract personal theology. In a study of 210 Christian college students, De Witt (1987) found small but significant differences in moral reasoning based upon the subject's level of intrinsic religious motivation. Ang (1989) studied 41 Bible college students and found intrinsic religious motivation was related to higher moral reasoning (DIT) more than extrinsic motivation. Ang concluded Bible colleges should incorporate pedagogy that would facilitate development of intrinsic religious motivation.

Ernsberger (1977) and Ernsberger and Manaster (1981) used the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) to factor intrinsic/extrinsic orientation into the DIT scores. They found intrinsically-oriented (church institution-oriented) church members were more likely to espouse moral reasoning of their church's theology. This could indicate personality interaction with the DIT. Similar studies, however, did not result in similar observations (Brown & Annis, 1978; Waters, 1980). Ernsberger and Manaster's research has not been sufficiently validated. Findings relating intrinsic religious motivation and authority were consistent with Fowler's faith development model (Wallwork, 1980). According to Fowler, an individual's faith was deepened and strengthened through thoughtful reflection on religious beliefs and a willingness to investigate new religious ideas.

Many researchers found no relationship between religious identification and moral judgment. Warren (1992) did not find significant differences between students at Christian schools and public school students. Bruggeman (1996) also found no relationship between attending public or private religious high schools in outcomes of P scores. Wahrman (1980) did not find a significant relationship between moral reasoning and religiosity or amount of time one has been actively religious. No significant differences in moral reasoning were found in the religiosity of two-year nursing students (Aronovitz, 1984). Guldhammer (1982) found principled reasoning increased across college, but the increase was unrelated to religious identification. Catholicism was found to be unrelated to moral development among college students (Wahrman, 1981).

Researchers investigating religious beliefs also frequently found no relationship between beliefs and moral judgment. Washington (1999) did not find any relationship between religious beliefs and moral development or religious activities and moral development among 149 college students. In a study of 392 freshmen at a Christian college, Banks (1995) found no significant differences on DIT scores between those classified as liberals and those classified as conservatives on religiosity measures. In a convenience sample of students at a large secular university, Hansen (1995) did not find any relationship between moral judgment and religiosity, regardless of the liberalism or conservatism of the individual's religious orientation. Wahrman (1981) found a weak 0.153 correlation between religious dogmatism and moral development.

Longitudinal studies were infrequent in the literature, but researchers using such data often reported no relationships between religion and moral judgment. McNeel

(1991) performed longitudinal and cross-sectional studies of students in a Christian college and found students showed principled level maturation equivalent to national norms. No statistically significant differences were reported among students at Christian colleges and those students attending secular schools in a study combining cross-sectional and longitudinal data (Buier, Butman, Burwell & VanWicklin, 1989).

Some researchers found negative relationships between religion and DIT scores. Hoagland (1984) found conservative Christians used less principled reasoning than liberals and nonreligious individuals, and conservative Christians were more likely to operate at conventional stages. Faqua (1983) reported Christian college students scored below national norms on the DIT. The lower scores were found both in science majors and religion majors. Being a science or a religion major was not significantly related to moral reasoning.

A difference between church members and nonmembers, with nonmembers scoring higher on the DIT, was found by McGeorge (1976). Clouse (1991) and Stoop (1979) found Christians generally scored at stage 4 (as cited in Rest, 1986). In another study by Nelson (1998), Bible college students showed very slight progress in moral development and remained in the conventional stages. Ernsberger and Manaster (1981) found negative relationships between religiosity and moral judgment, even after controlling for socio-economic factors (as cited in Rest).

Positive findings relating religion and moral judgment were reported by some researchers. Positive studies involving students included Harris (1981), Friend (1991) and Nelson (2004). Harris found biblical literacy and P scores were significantly related

among high school students (cited in Rest, 1986). Friend found seminary students scored higher on the DIT than liberal arts undergraduate students. Nelson found biblical literacy, moral development, and academic development progressed together among Bible college students, but moral development was more related to biblical literacy than academic development.

As previously reported, Nelson (2004) found P scores may have underreported the moral thinking of Christians. Another study supporting Nelson's proposal was conducted by Hsieh (2003). Hsieh asked first-year, senior and graduate students, as well as faculty, to complete the DIT-2 twice. In one examination, they were asked to complete the instrument according to their own thoughts. In another administration, participants were asked to complete the instrument according to their understanding of liberal values. All groups improved their moral reasoning scores when acting as liberals. Hsieh concluded educated Christians may well have understood liberal values, although their religious convictions led them to choose more conventional reasoning.

Good and Cartwright (1998) found Bible college students showed moral growth during their freshmen year yet reverted to lower level thinking by their senior year. Good and Cartwright concluded the senior students had learned to think at higher stages yet chose to ignore that moral philosophy in favor of conforming to the expectations of their religious community. Wilcox (1986) reported evidence that some people may demonstrate lower moral reasoning because they fear being labeled as troublemakers or socially deviant. The immature yet principled thinker may find it difficult to advocate a principled life in a conventional world. Kuran (1997) has written about the common

phenomenon of people misrepresenting their own beliefs in order to conform to social norms.

Overall, the literature available concerning moral judgment of Christians was quite contentious. In his detailed review of literature, Rest (1986) agreed with Kohlberg and concluded religion was generally independent of moral judgment. Such a conclusion was in contrast with the work of Fowler who directly tied the development of moral judgment to the development of faith. Fowler's definition of faith, however, was not faith in the common religious sense (e.g., God's providence) but rather faith in unproven ideas.

Previous research frequently suffered from significant flaws. Any research in which religion was defined through self-identification or membership in an association, such as a church or religious college, should be considered suspect (Lee, 1980). Just as voter registration in a certain party does not provide significant information about a voter's ideology on most issues, religious identification is not the same as religious conviction.

The self-identified ideology of individuals has been found to bear almost no resemblance to the actual beliefs of those individuals (Converse, 1964). Further, Converse argued the great majority of people are so lacking in critical, especially abstract, thought, they cannot be said to truly hold any ideology. Personal development, whether in terms of moral judgment, religious faith, or political involvement, is contingent upon personal autonomy, thoughtful reflection, and discourse.

Autonomous, reflective, and active religious belief should result in more developed moral judgment. The program evaluated in this dissertation was considered to

involve those developmental prerequisites. The rationale for this consideration is developed later in this chapter.

DIT and Prisoners

The shortcomings of Gilligan's care framework have been partially addressed earlier in this chapter. A study by Gilgun (1995), however, bore significance for this dissertation. Gilgun investigated whether criminals displayed emphasis on care (Gilligan's theory) or justice (Kohlberg and Rest's theories). While the study did not involve the DIT, its results provided considerable support to the validity claims of the DIT in terms of both stage theory and applicability to the current study's population.

Gilgun (1995) interviewed prisoners convicted of incest to determine whether such offenders held justice or care moral orientations. She hypothesized offenders would be justice oriented, because she believed the masculine and impersonal qualities of justice would be more amenable to incest than the compassionate and personal concepts of care. She concluded, however, incest perpetrators unanimously favored care orientations. Incest perpetrators could more easily justify their actions through a care orientation, which was inherently subjective and fluid.

In the field of corrections, the DIT has been used in many ways. For example, Horan and Kaplan (1983) used the DIT to understand the sentencing decisions of jurists. There was little research, however, directly related to this current program evaluation. Directly related work had been absent for some time because NOBTS was the only undergraduate college operating within a prison at the time of this study.

When the federal government cut financial aid for prisoner education, the University of Great Falls was operating a prison college. The University conducted a program evaluation in an attempt to justify state funding that would have continued the program. Unfortunately, they found their program had virtually no impact on the moral development of prisoners (Nelson, 1995). Spartanburg Methodist College also attempted a program evaluation to justify its prison college in the face of federal budget cuts. According to Everhart (1992), Spartanburg's program provided some effect on the self-esteem of black prisoners, but showed little else in terms of successful education.

Prison populations were noted by Rest (1974) as being among the most difficult to help. Rest referred to educating prisoners as "extremely problematic" (p. 250). In fact, he noted an absence of literature to guide policy and specifically remarked on the need for such research. He warned of the potential challenge of prison rehabilitation, but suggested even modest gains in the moral reasoning of prisoners would be "spectacular" (p. 250).

In moral development testing, prisoners generally attained P scores similar to middle school students (Rest, 1979b). The mean score for prisoners was 23.5, and the mean score for middle school students was 21.9. People at this level of reasoning tended to be egocentric in their moral reasoning. These scores compared with means of 31.8 for high school students, 40 for adults, 42.3 for college students, 59.8 for seminarians at liberal Protestant schools, and 65.2 for academic philosophers. Prisoners generally reason at stages 2 or 3, measured by Kohlberg's model (Stevenson, Hall & Innes, 2003). Considering that Angola was home to only violent and habitual offenders, it may be

Angola inmates used moral reasoning no higher than the average for prisoners, and most likely reasoned at lower levels.

One explanation for the low growth of prisoners may be found in the work of Jessor and Jessor (1977). They investigated the thinking of delinquent youths and found criminals were significantly more likely to exhibit external loci of control. External loci of control are inconsistent with the autonomy said to be necessary for moral growth. External loci of control may also make an individual less likely to engage in critical reflection, since the results of reflection are not likely to be viewed as useful. In order for the Seminary at LSP to be successful, it may need to facilitate self-empowerment of inmates. Such self-empowerment can be difficult in a prison population where members are unable to control virtually any aspect of their lives.

DIT and Pedagogy

The best method for moral education had been a topic of debate through much of human history. Aristotle and Socrates lectured on moral development in ancient Greece. Augustine and Erasmus proposed ideas of moral education in the ancient churches. Moral education pedagogy, like moral philosophy, has changed across times and places.

Kohlberg's general theory and advice on educational pedagogy evolved across his career (Rest et al, 2000). According to Rest (1974), Kohlberg's pedagogy was a blending of Dewey's philosophy and Piaget's psychology. Kohlberg insisted any moral education must be based in developmental theory. Moral education could not be virtue or habit oriented but must have encouraged thoughtful analysis (Kohlberg, 1966). Like Kohlberg,

Rest (1986) refuted Aristotle's assertion that morality was a product of good parenting and was firmly established by adulthood. According to Rest (1986), "adults show more change than younger participants in moral education programs" (p. 177).

The possibility of moral growth in adulthood was essential for the success of criminal rehabilitation efforts. The effort at LSP presupposed moral development was more fluid and adaptable for adults than suggested by Aristotle. Aristotle (1994), in his writings, displayed a concern for justice, but he believed morality was a factor of pedagogy built upon pedigree. Educational theory, at least since Dewey, has been significantly more democratic. Additionally, earlier Christian educators, such as Erasmus and Raikes, believed the lowliest members of society were capable of full moral growth (Reed & Prevost, 1993).

According to Kohlberg (1966), moral teaching should be targeted one stage above the level of the learners. Such teaching was within the limits learners were able to understand, while it still required the learners to stretch mentally as they sought to understand the materials. This teaching method was unrealistic, however. A teacher could not assess a learner's response to categorize the stage and then develop an appropriate response, all within the timeframe available in class (Rest, 1974).

The difficulty of individuals teaching according to developmental theory may have been one reason Kohlberg developed a structural approach to moral education (Bar-Yam et al., 1980). He advocated the Just Community model, which was based on the use of social environments to foster moral growth. The Just Community model incorporated democratic governance, even with small children. The democratic principles facilitated

the dialogue necessary for exposure to new ideas, especially the controversial ideas traditionally repressed in less open societies.

Just communities operated through a social contract system, which was based in principled reasoning. An example Kohlberg provided for a Just Community was the kibbutz movement, which expanded through Israel in the 1970s. Kohlberg believed the religious socialism of the Jewish kibbutz was consistent with the democratic debate necessary for moral development (Bar-Yam et al., 1980).

A kibbutz was a small, communal, egalitarian microcosm. Rules in a kibbutz were socially created. Once rules were created, however, significant social pressure was placed on individuals to maintain obligations under the social contract. This social pressure sustaining kibbutz life seemed inconsistent with the philosophy of moral autonomy and self-created moral principles Kohlberg formed from Kant. Kohlberg explained the pressure was not inconsistent with his Kantian philosophy, however, because the pressure existed to encourage more moral behavior (Bar-Yam et al., 1980).

The founding principle of a kibbutz was a commitment to the creation of social justice. Therefore, the kibbutz social pressure was a pressure to be more just. Kohlberg viewed this pressure as something to facilitate the principled reasoning of the individual, who has presumably self-committed to justice. In other words, the kibbutz pressure was opposite of the social pressure that motivated individuals to surrender principles to the convention of society (Good & Cartwright, 1998; Kuran, 1997, Wilcox, 1986). In terms of the neo-Kohlbergian model, the Just Community used social pressure to bridge the

gaps between moral judgment (component 2), moral motivation (component 3) and moral virtue (component 4).

Kohlberg viewed religious systems to be external orders, which were rooted in stage 4 thinking (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). Orders, whether from a visiting angel, the Ten Commandments, the Bible, or a priest, were rules and not principles. Consequently, Kohlberg viewed religious education as being of little moral value. According to Kohlberg (1966), religious education was almost never effective in advancing moral thought. This reinforced Kohlberg's definition of religion in terms of social systems (e.g., churches and denominations) rather than in terms internal belief systems.

Researchers have often come to different conclusions about religion's impact on morality when they considered religion at the individual level. Ang (1989) reported intrinsically motivated Christians exhibited higher moral reasoning than extrinsically motivated individuals. Religion that was internalized and personally meaningful, then, appeared to have benefits for moral judgment. Ang investigated students at a Bible college who were presumably the more theologically conventional members of their religious communities. Ang concluded religious education pedagogy targeted at developing internal religious reflection led to greater moral development.

Rest (1986) supported the idea that one's motivation toward education was a great influence on moral development. He also supported the Kohlbergian combination of individual reflection and social support for moral development.

Development proceeds most when the person seeks to develop and when the situation fosters and supports development. Personal characteristics and environmental characteristics mutually influence each other. (p. 52)

The people who develop in moral judgment are those who love to learn, who seek new challenges, who enjoy intellectually stimulating environments, who are reflective, who make plans and set goals, who take risks, who see themselves in the larger social contexts of history and institutions and broad cultural trends, who take responsibility for themselves and their environs (p. 177)

In general, prison inmates have not normally been academically oriented. This may be a primary reason why prison education programs tend to receive little interest from prisoners (Everhart, 1992). Contrarily, the LSP program's enrollment capacity was not large enough to satisfy the amount of interest from inmates. It was unknown, however, what actually motivated students to participate in the program. It was possible students simply wanted to alleviate boredom as was reported by many participants in Everhart's study. It may also have been these seminarians genuinely wanted to work in ministry. A vocational interest in ministry did not, however, necessarily demonstrate an academic interest in theology.

The vocational and practical foci of the LSP Seminary may have had a positive influence on moral development even apart from academic interest in theology. Deemer (1987) found a relationship between vocational satisfaction and moral judgment. According to Rest (1986), the Deemer coding method "gives more importance to the subject's own sense of identity and doing personally meaningful work than to financial security" (p. 54). This could have benefited students in Angola, because they presumably committed themselves to a religious vocation they believed would be meaningful and would fulfill their 'calling.' Maslow (1987/1954) proposed vocation was important to personal fulfillment and growth. If the LSP Seminary facilitated a student's vocational

development and personal fulfillment, the educational atmosphere may have been more conducive to moral growth.

Another important finding from Deemer (1987) was his identification of “civic responsibility” and “political awareness” as important factors relating to moral judgment (as cited in Rest, 1986, pp. 54-55). The prison environment was noted earlier as being overwhelmingly inconsistent with any sort of social activism. LSP’s warden, Burl Cain, noted traditional corrections theory rejected any sort of empowerment for prisoners. Many in the corrections field criticized the LSP Seminary precisely because it empowered students (Frink, 2002).

Wright (2001) found community service was not related to increased moral development among students at a Christian college. Wright investigated community service requirements as part of a Christian college curriculum. Community service, especially externally organized community service, was not the same as the civic empowerment and activism investigated by Deemer (1987).

Education was related to moral development. According to Rest (1986), “One of the strongest and most consistent correlates of development in moral judgment have been years in formal education, even more so than chronological age per se” (p. 33). Rest noted, however, that “short-term” moral education programs, lasting fewer than three weeks, had not been shown to be effective. Moral education programs, such as found in semester-long ethics courses, could be effective in producing small improvements in P scores. Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) noted college, overall, was a substantial catalyst for moral development.

Despite research showing certain programs, and education in general, to be a positive influences on moral development, the exact experiences that cause moral growth were still unknown. Rest (1986) compared research attempts to discern which life experiences foster moral growth to research attempts to discern which foods make people obese. There was no clear answer because different people gained moral judgment from different experiences just as different people gained weight from different foods.

Moral development appeared to be more gradual than punctuated. While general activities, such as college attendance, were related to development, Rest (1986) could not identify specific moments or moral issues that caused growth. An experiential example provided by Rest was that the socio-moral issues of dodging the Selective Service draft did not discernibly affect moral judgment. Rest (1974) did identify participative education as one pedagogical technique with the potential for moral impact. Moral development could be fostered by providing students with opportunities to involve themselves in new “social roles,” such as “teacher, counselor, or caretaker.” The key to such moral growth opportunities was to provide students with “real responsibility” (Rest, 1974, p. 255).

The LSP Seminary students were active in their religious communities and were involved in the field where they felt called for their vocations. The program’s addition of internships allowed the practice of pastoral responsibility among students. A pastor has been biblically defined in Rest’s terms of being a “teacher, counselor, [and] caretaker.” As students studying pastoral work, and actively involved in aspects of that work, the

LSP students may have been exposed to the developmental catalysts infamously absent in the corrections system.

Clinical Pastor Education (CPE) training significantly increased the moral reasoning of seminary students who were below their group average at the beginning of training (Leeland, 1990). No significant change was found in those students who began the program at the average or higher than average levels of moral reasoning. It was unknown whether the more advanced students had previously been exposed to the learning experiences provided by CPE, and were therefore less affected by it, or whether CPE was generally less effective for advanced moral thinkers. Regardless of the reason advanced thinkers benefited less from pastoral experiences as part of their education, Leeland's findings were significant for the LSP population. If LSP students began their education at the low levels of moral reasoning expected of prisoners, the practical education of LSP should have been quite beneficial.

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)

MBTI Construction

The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, developed by Katherine Briggs and Isabel Briggs Myers, was based upon Carl Jung's psychological theory. Jung posited human personalities could be classified according to the methods by which individuals cognitively received new information, and the processes by which individuals processed that information. For each consideration, there were two personality types. People

received information either intuitively or through the senses. The person with a preference for Intuition (N) preferred to receive information as concepts or systems. The person with a preference for Sensing (S) preferred to receive information in practical or concrete manners (Myers et al., 2003).

People processed information either through thinking or through feelings. The person with a preference for Thinking (T) preferred to process information through objective, rational analysis. The person with a preference for Feeling (F) preferred to process information by evaluating the information in accordance with personal values (Myers et al., 2003).

Briggs and Myers (Myers et al., 2003) further developed Jung's theory to include two more aspects of personality. They added considerations of how a person interacted with the world, and how people acted upon their information processing. Briggs and Myers proposed people were either Extroverts (E) or Introverts (I), and either Judging (J) or Perceiving (P). Introverts preferred to focus their energy internally. Extroverts preferred to focus their energy externally. People who preferred Judging worked to make decisions with their information and to organize their environs. People who preferred Perceiving were more inclined to leave evaluations of information flexible and adaptable.

Although each dichotomy (i.e., E/I, S/N, T/F, J/P) of the MBTI operated independently of the others, the combinations formed the full MBTI personality "type." Someone with preferences for Extraversion, Intuition, Thinking, and Judging was not merely an E, an N, a T, and a J. The person was an ENTJ. The interaction of each independent dichotomy created a unique total personality. Thinking Extroverts did their

thinking differently than Thinking Introverts. In total, there were 16 MBTI types (Myers et al., 2003).

The MBTI instrument was a paper and pencil, multiple choice assessment administered by practitioners qualified according to the guidelines of the MBTI publisher, the Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT). CAPT allowed practitioners to be qualified through academic credentials, CAPT training, or university supervision. The researcher conducting this study was qualified by CAPT through all three criteria.

Item statements in the MBTI were similar in theoretical construction to those in the DIT. The wordings were provided in a manner that elicited specific thoughts in individual readers. At the same time, statements did not provide the details necessary for readers to construct a new concept or discern the instrument's intention. Like the DIT, the MBTI had been used for decades, administered to multitudes of people, and utilized and validated through thousands of studies (Myers et al., 2003).

An important feature of the MBTI was the theoretical assumption that all MBTI personality types were inherently natural and healthy. Unlike many other psychological measures, such as the Neo Personality Assessment, the MBTI could not be used to classify anyone as ordinally higher or lower than anyone else. The MBTI was designed to help individuals understand themselves and others, not to form a basis for diagnosing or treating participants (Myers et al., 2003). Table 1 provides information on the distribution of personality types in the American population.

Table 1
 Type of Percentage of US Population Demographic Groups

Type	US Total	Blacks	Males	Male College Students
ISTJ	12-16	15.0	16.4	12.48
ISFJ	10-13	12.7	8.1	5.44
INFJ	2-3	1.4	1.2	2.65
INTJ	3-4	1.9	3.3	5.40
ISTP	5-7	5.8	8.5	6.81
ISFP	5-7	10.0	7.6	4.09
INFP	4-5	2.5	4.1	5.32
INTP	5-6	3.6	4.8	6.63
ESTP	5-7	6.1	5.6	6.72
ESFP	6-9	9.7	6.9	4.41
ENFP	6-8	8.9	6.4	6.26
ENTP	4-7	1.4	4.0	6.77
ESTJ	10-12	8.9	11.2	12.81
ESFJ	10-12	8.6	7.5	5.46
ENFJ	3-5	1.1	1.6	2.98
ENTJ	3-5	2.5	2.7	5.78
E	50-55	47.1	45.9	51.18
I	45-50	52.9	54.1	48.82
S	65-70	76.8	71.7	58.22
N	30-35	23.2	28.3	41.78
T	45-55	42.7	56.5	63.4
F	45-55	57.3	43.5	36.6
P	40-45	47.9	48.0	47.0
J	55-60	52.1	52.0	53.0

Note. Data collected from Myers et al., 2003.

MBTI and the DIT

Because the MBTI presupposed all personality types were inherently equal in terms of psycho-social value, it would have been reasonable to think personality types were unrelated to moral judgment. Research did not support that presupposition, however. The philosophical foundations of Kohlberg were predisposed to certain

personality types. The differences in moral reasoning related to personality type were not a reason to discount either instrument, however. Instead, a theoretical synthesis of the DIT and MBTI can actually help evaluators and educators. Evaluators may integrate the MBTI instrument with moral evaluation to better understand research results. Educators may use an understanding of the MBTI theory to create pedagogy that better addresses the individual student.

The Kantian ethical system of evaluating individual actions through universalized systems was Intuitive (N), rather than Sensing (S). The objective, formal Thinking (T) preference was more aligned with the calculated rationalism of Kant than the personal values orientation of the Feeling (F) preference. The reflective nature of Introversion (I) was logically more related to Kantian ethics than the social orientation of Extraversion (E). Finally, the tentativeness and openness of Perceiving (P) types was hypothetically more inclined toward postconventional growth than the Judging (J) preference, which was related to preferences for definition and closure. In theory, then, an INTP would have been most amenable to moral development, and an ESFJ would have been least amenable to moral development.

Advanced moral thinking was contingent upon the synthesis and systemization of abstract principles and philosophies (Rest, 1974). Such higher order thinking was similar to the descriptions of Thinking (T) and especially Intuition (N) in Myers-Briggs typology. Feeling (F) oriented people sought decision-making through subjectively evaluating the scenario, whereas Thinking (T) oriented people were more likely to seek the incorporation of universal principles. Intuitive types looked for the whole system in

operation, while Sensors sought the obvious answer to the present circumstances (Myers et al., 2003).

According to Hirsh and Kise (2000), NTs were likely to create new systems for application and SFs frequently worked to build community. Therefore, NTs were naturally consistent with Kohlberg's theory, while SFs were more naturally inclined toward conventional reasoning. Hasler (1987) hypothesized the Introverted (I) personality type would be related to higher moral reasoning, as measured by the Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM). Hasler, however, found the E/I scale was not related to moral development, while the J/P scale was significant to moral development. Those with Perceiving (P) preferences were likely to score higher on moral reasoning than those with Judging (J) preferences. Hasler concluded the closure-seeking tendencies of Js made them less likely to seek and internalize the new experiences necessary to cause moral growth.

The relationship between personality type and moral reasoning was investigated by O'Brien (2000). She found the perception (S/N) and judging (T/F) functions were both significantly related to moral reasoning scores. Additionally, the perception and judging functions combined to create a significant interaction effect for moral reasoning. The Feeling (F) preference was significantly related to more frequent use of stage 3 reasoning than the Thinking (T) preference. Intuition (N) judgment was related to more frequent post-conventional moral reasoning than Sensing (S). Taylor (1992) also found Thinking (T) was related to higher moral reasoning than Feeling (F). Contrary to most research,

McMahon (1992) found the Feeling (F) preference was related to higher moral reasoning. Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were related to stage 4 reasoning.

Redford (1993) hypothesized higher moral reasoning among people with preferences for Extraversion (E), Intuition (N), Thinking (T) and/or Perceiving (P) preferences. She found ISFJ and ISTJ were both underrepresented among participants with above-average moral reasoning. Further findings included the Intuitive (N) and Introverted Perceiving (IP) preferences were significantly related to above average moral reasoning. Redford concluded the moral growth of ISJs was slowed because they were more focused on the present and less willingly to entertain conflicting paradigms.

Unlike O'Brien (2000), Redford (1993) did not find significant moral reasoning differences between participants with Thinking (T) and Feeling (F) preferences. Redford's research built upon the findings of Catoe (1992) and Denny (1988). Catoe (1992) found Intuition (N) was related to higher moral reasoning than Sensing (S) and Denny (1988) found no difference in moral reasoning based upon the Thinking (T) or Feeling (F) preferences of the participants. Denny (1988) did not use the DIT or MJI but chose the Social Reflection Questionnaire (SRM). The difference in method may account for not finding a relationship between MBTI preference and moral reasoning.

Gilligan's theory of women using a care orientation, as opposed to male justice, had not been validated by subsequent research. Gender differences in personality type might be used to partially explain some moral orientations. Women were moderately more likely to prefer Feeling (F), and men were moderately more likely to prefer Thinking (T) (Myers et al., 2003).

A relationship between Feeling and care is not necessarily supportive of Gilligan's theory. Neither is it contrary to Kohlberg's claims of a universal moral theory. Additionally, the MBTI preferences were not absolute descriptions of human thought and action. A preference simply implied the most natural behavior for an individual. In fact, a fundamental part of MBTI theory was that all people used all preference types at some time. An Introvert was not absolutely disinterested in socializing. A person who preferred Feeling (e.g., values) was not absolutely disinterested in objectivity. Therefore, a person with a preference for Extraversion, Sensing, Feeling and/or Judging was not incapable of using the opposite types, which were more related to principled moral judgment. Moreover, mature personality development included the practice of using the less preferred types (Myers et al., 2003).

If a person who preferred Feeling was not naturally drawn to the objectivity and impersonality of Kantian autonomy and rationalism, mature type development would allow that Feeling person to use the Thinking preference well enough to incorporate moral principles. Similarly, people who preferred Thinking may have been naturally drawn toward autonomy and impersonality, but those people should develop the Feeling aspect of personality well enough to develop and incorporate values into their rationalism.

The humanistic rationalism of Kant, the cognitive psychology of Kohlberg, the personality typology of Myers and Briggs, and even Christian theology all assume a basic human dignity from which each person can develop to healthy personal fulfillment. Researchers have generally found Introversion (I), Intuition (N), Thinking (T) and

Perceiving (P) to be influences on higher levels of moral judgment. One's MBTI type preference was an influence on the path to one's moral development but was not the arbitrator of one's moral development. Personality was not destiny.

MBTI and Christians

MBTI personality preferences have been shown to be related to moral judgment. Some researchers have also reported certain type preferences were over- or underrepresented among Christians. Additionally, some researchers have found particular personality types were more predictive of vocational interest in ministry.

Childerston (1985) reported moral reasoning was related to fundamentalist theology and type preference was related to level of fundamentalism, making type preference indirectly related to moral reasoning among Bible college students. Childerston noted this was an important distinction because unlike moral stages, no type was presumed to be better than another. The key to moral development for Bible college students with the Sensing preference, who were overrepresented in the Bible college, was in mature type development in which people exercised their secondary preferences (i.e., Intuition).

College students with higher DIT scores were found by Volker (1979) to be less religiously active than the average (as cited in Rest, 1986) for college students. This could have been a factor of the Extraversion/Introversion dichotomy. Introverts were more likely to score well on tests and less likely to be involved in any social communities (Myers et al., 2003). If actively religious people were more likely to be Extraverts, and

Extraverts scored lower on the DIT, it may have been Extraversion and not religious activity that was directly related to lower levels of moral judgment.

MBTI preferences bore tremendous relationships with individuals' interests in religion, moral autonomy and vocational ministry. Table 2 shows type preferences related to such issues. ISTPs, INTPs, INFPs and ENTPs were the four groups most likely to rank "autonomy" as "very important." ISFJs, ESFPs, ESFJs and INFJs were most likely to rank "spirituality" as "very important" (Myers et al., 2003, p. 315). INTPs were the most likely type to desire autonomy, while ESFJs were the least likely to desire autonomy. Conversely, INTPs were least likely to desire spirituality, while ESFJs were most likely to desire spirituality.

Table 2
Type Correlation with Values and Careers

Type	Values Autonomy	Values Spirituality	Vocational Ministry
ISFJ		X	
INFJ		X	X
ISTP	X		
INFP	X		
INTP	X ^a	Y	
ESFP		X	
ENFP			X
ENTP	X		
ESFJ	Y	X ^a	X
ENFJ			X

Note. Data collected from Myers et al., 2003. X^a = Type with highest correlation to descriptor. Y = Type with lowest correlation to descriptor.

The types most likely to enter careers in ministry were INFJ, ISFJ, ENFP, ENFJ and ESFJ. Ministry careers were among the 10 most common careers for 6 of the 8 Feeling (F) types. Additionally, the five types most likely to enter vocational ministry included all four FJ types (INFJ, ISFJ, ENFJ and ESFJ). Notably, vocational ministry was not listed as one of the 10 most likely careers for any Thinking (T) type. Vocational ministry was one of the 10 least likely careers for INTP, ENTP, ENTJ, ESTP, ISTP, ISTJ, accounting for six of the eight Thinking (T) types (Myers et al., 2003). The Feeling preference was highly related to ministry careers, while the Thinking preference was a clear predictor of disinterest in ministry careers.

The relationships between MBTI preferences and religious vocations were studied by Ruppert (1985). Catholic priests and nuns were likely to be ISFJs. Protestant and Jewish clergy were frequently ENFJs. Considering all clergy together, nearly four-fifths were Feeling (F) oriented and almost three-quarters were Judging (J) oriented. The ministerial type was FJ, while fewer than one in ten clergy were NTs or SPs. Phoon (1987) found ESFJs were significantly overrepresented among Seventh Day Adventist clergy.

The findings relating to types among clergy did not indicate that people of less common types were ill-suited for ministry. The MBTI was not a career placement test. In Phoon's (1987) study of Seventh Day Adventists, she found Introverts (I) often found ways to serve through behind-the-scenes activities, such as prayer. Those participants who saw themselves as church leaders, whether pastoral leaders, or managerial leaders, were more likely to have Extraverted (E) preferences. In another study of career

satisfaction among clergy, Thinkers (T) were more satisfied with administrative responsibilities, while Sensors (S) were more satisfied with interpersonal responsibilities (Johnson, 1991).

Three important studies involved investigations of personality types among Southern Baptist ministers. Welchel (1996) studied MBTI type frequencies of 2,630 Southern Baptist missionaries which accounted for three-quarters of all SBC missionaries. Welchel obtained the data from the SBC which had administered the MBTI to every new missionary for the previous decade. He found Sensing (S) and Feeling (F) preferences were most common. However, Intuitive (N) types were most likely to persevere in missions. Sanson (2000) studied Southern Baptist pastors seeking the Doctor of Ministry degree and found Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were the most common and overrepresented among the pastors. Berryhill (1991) found Feeling (F) was overrepresented among seminarians at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary.

The Berryhill (1991), Welchel (1996) and Sanson (2000) studies bore significant relevance for this program evaluation, but they also involved some distinctions from this research. Berryhill studied students at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville, KY . Welchel studied international missionaries. Sanson studied professional doctoral students. In general, their findings supported the common findings that Sensing (S), Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences were overrepresented among ministers. Bramer (1995) also found S, F and J preferences were related to ministerial careers among evangelical ministers. Further, Bramer found type differences were related to

preferences for types of ministerial roles and the social attributes individuals preferred in their churches.

Sensing and Judging preferences on the MBTI have been found to be predictive of conventional moral reasoning among Bible college students. Intuitive (N) preferences were predictive of less fundamentalist theology than Sensing (S) preferences among Bible college students (Childerston, 1985). Lee (1985) found MBTI personality types related to significant differences in commitment to the theological tenants of one's church. The Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences predicted greater commitment. SF and J preferences were overrepresented among religiously conservative males. Harman (1982) found the Feeling (F) preference was overrepresented among students entering a Church of Christ college.

People with a preference for Sensing (S) tended to seek hands-on careers. Those who preferred Feeling (F) sought careers that combined "service" and were "harmonious." Those with a preference for Judging (J) sought careers that operated according to a "system and order." The fit between SFJ preferences and ministerial careers was clear. By contrast, the Intuitive (N) preference led toward careers involving "new problems to be solved." The Perceiving (P) preference led toward work based on "understanding situations; Thinking (T) led to careers with "logical...ideas" (Myers et al., 2003, p. 293.) The inclinations of NTP types, who were very unlikely to enter ministry, fit more closely with Kohlberg's theory than did the inclinations of SFJs who were quite likely to enter ministry.

MBTI and Prisoners

Very little research has been conducted to learn about personality types and criminology. Lippin (1988) investigated personality types among female prisoners in Maryland. Livernoise (1987) studied personality types among male prisoners in the Orange County, FL jail. Combined, their studies provided interesting information on personalities and criminal behavior. Their studies, however, were limited to small populations and were not necessarily generalizable.

Thinking (T) was overrepresented among the females (Lippin, 1988); the preference for Thinking (T) was especially pronounced in women convicted of crimes involving drugs or violence. Livernoise (1987), whose findings are displayed in Table 3, found Feeling (F) to be overrepresented among males. Lippin's finding that Thinking (T) was related to criminal behavior was counterintuitive. One possible interpretation may be a relationship between low levels of education and criminal behavior in Thinkers (T). Perhaps the low education common among the female prisoners restricted the women's ability to adequately utilize their Thinking (T) preferences. Lippin and Livernoise both found Introverts (I) were overrepresented among the incarcerated populations.

The inclusion of males in Livernoise's (1987) study was particularly relevant to this research project. In general, Livernoise found the Intuition (I), Sensing (S) and Feeling (F) preferences were related to incarceration, while Extraversion (E), Intuition (N) and Thinking (T) types were underrepresented. SJs and FJs were overrepresented among those convicted of sexual crimes. IPs were overrepresented among inmates convicted of violent crimes and EPs were overrepresented among crimes involving theft.

Table 3
Relationships between Personality and Criminal Charges

Charge	Types Overrepresented	Types Underrepresented
All Charges	ISTP, ESFP, ESFJ, I, S, F, SP, SF, TP	INTJ, ISFP, ESTJ, ENTJ, E, N, T, IN, NT, EJ
Murder	IP	
Sexual Misconduct	ESFJ, J, SJ, FJ	P
Kidnapping	INFP, IN	
Drugs	ENTJ, EJ	
All Personal Assault	INFP	EP
Burglary, Theft, and Robbery	ENFP, EP	

Note. Data collected from Livernoise (1987). Study included 298 inmates at a county jail.

MBTI and LSP

Overall, the literature on the DIT and the MBTI did not indicate LSP Seminary students should have been expected to do well on a measure of moral judgment. Table 4 provides a synthesis of findings concerning the DIT and MBTI as related to this study.

Prisoners typically had very low moral judgment abilities. Christians, as well, frequently scored below comparative averages on the DIT. The review of data on the MBTI revealed the MBTI preferences most common to Christians, ministers, prisoners, and blacks were all predictive of lower than average DIT scores. Quite simply, the LSP

Seminary students were expected to have most personality type factors working against them.

Table 4
Personality Relationships to Descriptors

Descriptors	Types Overrepresented
High P score	N, T, P, IP
Low P score	S, F, J
Prisoners	I, S, F, SP, SF, IP
Ministers	S, F, J
Religious	S, F, J, SF

Theology

This program evaluation was intended to measure the success of the NOBTS program at LSP in promoting moral development among students. In order to devise a method for such an evaluation, it was necessary to have an understanding of moral development theory. Equally important, however, was to understand what moral philosophy was most fitting for an evaluation of the Seminary. An appropriate program evaluation cannot measure the program against a standard incongruent with the program curriculum and goals.

Kohlberg's (1966) developmental model of morality was just one of many moral philosophies. The literature concerning Kohlberg's model and Christian populations was

mixed. Some researchers reported no significant relationship between religiosity and morality. Other researchers found a negative relationship between Christianity and moral judgment. Few researchers found religiosity to be beneficial to moral development.

While Kohlberg (1966) and the theological frame of the Seminary diverged in significant areas, these differences were not so great as to negate the use of Kohlberg's theory within a Christian context. Further, the literature reviewed indicated Baptist theology was principled in terms of Kohlberg's model.

Kohlberg and Theology

Kohlberg's (1967) bias against religion and his limited understanding of religion led him to misinterpret Christianity in some ways that negatively affect Christians evaluated using his model. These issues, once understood, may serve to bridge the gap between Kohlberg and Christianity and lead to more valid evaluations of Kohlberg, the DIT, and Christian moral programs.

Kohlberg's (1967) conclusion that religion was extraneous to moral development was meaningless, because Kohlberg defined religion by religious affiliation (Lee, 1980). Religious scholars considered self-identified religious affiliation to be minimally related to actual religiosity. Kohlberg's conclusions were biased by definition of religious belief.

The stages of Christian beliefs were directly compared to the stages of moral development by Kohlberg and Power (1981). Stage 3 was based on relationships in both Christian faith and moral development. Stage 3 religious thinking was described as defining sin as acts leading to embarrassment before God. In stage 4, moral decisions

were deferred to God's law. Stage 5 reasoning was based on the social contract and included God as a partner in the contract. In this stage, Kohlberg believed religion helped to supplement moral reasoning with a sense of meaning. Stage 6 was represented by luminaries, such as Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi, and Mother Teresa (Kohlberg & Power, 1981).

Despite Kohlberg's (1967) antagonism toward religious moral education, he noticed an undeniable relationship between religiosity and the people who he deemed most moral. Kohlberg considered Martin Luther King and Thomas Aquinas to be examples of stage 6 reasoning because both were determined to satisfy universal moral standards that were transcendental rather than governmental. Such transcendental moral principles were of paramount importance to Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Power, 1981; Kohlberg & Ryncarz, 1990).

Kohlberg and Power (1981) praised the moral concern of Christian theology but also declared that concern to be lower level thinking. They viewed the connection between God and the believer as inconsistent with autonomy.

Christianity and Judaism...view God's principal concern as being not for cultic worship but for love and justice. They emphasize that to be in harmony with God people must act morally, but they also stress that people must rely on God in order to live a moral life. (p. 321)

On one hand, Christians believed in principles of love (agape) and justice. On the other hand, Christians believed in obeying God's call for love and justice. For Kohlberg and Power (1981), the externality of God defiled Christian principles.

Kohlberg and Power (1981) continued to make the same mistakes as past secularists. According to Beach (1952), secular rationalist philosophers, such as Kant, accepted the role of religion in the morality of some of humanity's greatest heroes. They treated each hero's religion, however, as if it were somehow superfluous and dependent upon the innate qualities of the individuals (Beach). The error led such philosophers to the conclusion that true morality was always independent of religion.

Ferre (1951) explained Kierkegaard's theology of the relationship between God and good:

God and the true good cannot be separated. God does not do the good because the good is primary, nor does the good depend upon any arbitrary decree of deity. God is and does the good because his nature is and constitutes the nature of goodness. In so far as man knows the good, that far he knows God, and hence that good cannot be suspended without both violation of the ethical order and sinning against God. (pp. 246-247)

When Kohlberg evaluated Christians using his model, the Christians were evaluated as much by the semantics of their responses as by the meaning of those responses (Kohlberg & Power, 1981). It was not enough for Christians to appeal to love or justice; the Christians must have appealed using the right phraseology.

The Golden Rule was cited by Kohlberg (1973) as an example of principled reasoning because it was abstract. He contrasted the biblical imperative of the Golden Rule to the Ten Commandments which he stated were more concrete and legalistic. Still, the Golden Rule, according to Kohlberg (1973), was not always principled. Kohlberg (1973) claimed the Golden Rule could also be used in stage 3 or stage 6 reasoning. The variable nature of the Golden Rule led Kohlberg to conclude Christian moral philosophy

had no inherent moral stage. This conclusion, once again, reinforced Kohlberg's belief that religion was naturally inactive in moral development and merely supported moral reasoning achieved autonomously.

Comparing the biblical system to the Kohlbergian system was a method toward evaluating the compatibility of Christian theology and Kohlberg's philosophy. According to Aron (1977), in stage 4 reasoning "morality is conceived of as simply obeying existing laws and rules" (p. 206). In Stage 5, "morality is seen as transcending civil society and pertaining to the rights and duties of humanity as a whole" (p. 206). Finally, "the stage 6 individual sees it as his or her duty to enforce the rights of others" (p. 206). Analyzed in these terms, Christianity most closely fits stage 6. A difficulty in assigning stage 6 to Christian theology, however, was applying Kohlberg's (1981) own determination that stealing the drug was a duty for everyone because all persons would want the drug stolen if they were in the situation of Heinz's wife.

Baptist theology was unmistakably principled in many other ways. For example, Kohlberg (1982) cited liberty of conscience as principled stage 5 philosophy. The Christian theology of love (agape) was especially central to understanding both Kohlberg and Christianity. Kohlberg and Power (1981) considered the Christian theology of agape to be consistent with the highest stage of moral reasoning. Agape, constituting overriding, universal and consistent love for others and was a principal factor of Christianity. The authors also noted that while love, was a general religious theme, Christian agape was especially comprehensive and principled. They contrasted the active morality of agape with the passive doctrine of karma.

Kohlberg and Power (1981) addressed the question of whether the moral apex of agape, based in love, was in conflict with justice. In their conclusion, agape presupposed justice and was, therefore, not in conflict. The idea of agape progressing from justice then raised the question of whether agape was superior to justice, and therefore a seventh stage. They believed agape and justice were so interconnected that neither could be said to supersede the other. Agape and justice were coequal. Kohlberg and Power's explanation, however, did not entirely resolve their questions. They noted a community of Christians would "work selflessly together for one end, the glory of God as defined by their common religion" (p. 352). Yet they failed to address exactly how such people would respond to moral dilemma questions and why they would not be categorized as stage 4 thinkers for appealing to their external religion. Instead of directly answering such questions, Kohlberg and Power appealed to a perceived flexibility in their model.

The key to higher order thinking was the abstract concern for justice, rather than the outcome of that justice. Christians could appeal to God's glory as an outcome of just thinking, while devotees of other philosophies could appeal to other ideal outcomes. So, it was clear Kohlberg and Power (1981) believed actualized Christians would be stage 6 thinkers. The question remained as to whether actualized Christians would be scored as principled thinkers using Kohlberg's methodology.

Stage 7

Kohlberg and Power (1981) noted that while pure reason could provide knowledge of what should be done in a given situation, reason could not provide

motivation to do right when the costs became great. At that point, religion became a great basis for people to bear the costs of morality. Unfortunately, Kohlberg and Power (1981) treated religion, not as a true source of motivation, but as a psychological source. In other words, religion was much like a crutch for weak-willed people to build the courage to act on the morals they knew were just.

Kohlberg and Power (1981) argued the Christian concept of agape was in addition to the basic concept of justice. In their theory of a stage 7, based on agape, they defined agape as an act beyond the call of moral duty. This was a great addition but not necessary to achieve optimal stage 6 morality.

Many Christians were grappling with the complexity of moral dilemmas and the demands of justice well before Kohlberg began his research. For many Christians, agape was not an addition to morality, but the essence of morality. Justice was a foundation for many Christian ethics, but justice was insufficient in itself. A religion or ethic absent of agape would not bear any resemblance to Christianity. At the same time, the Christian ethic was based on the presumed foundation of justice.

Several years before Kohlberg wrote his dissertation that began his career, Beach (1952) foreshadowed Kohlberg and Power's (1981) stage 7.

A Christian social ethics can be based on the Bible only in a derivative sense.... Biblical morality throws light only obliquely on such pressing moral questions as the relation of justice and love, the criterion for choice among competing neighbor-claims, the issue of compromise and strategy within a social order which constricts all feasible choices down to evil options, the dialectic of freedom and order, etc. These are the central working problems of the Christian in the social arena. The New Testament 'law of love' can and must preside over the Christian debate on these matters, but in itself it is a remote judge. Mutually self-contradictory policies can often claim its sanction. (p. 116)

In the moral systems of Kant, Rawls and Kohlberg, development consisted partially of deciding what to value. For the Christian, the ultimate values were established. The abstract and cognitive question for Christians was how to apply those values. A Christian could not live out Christian ethics by following rules or developing the habits of virtue. The Bible served as a resource for the Christian to interpret what principles existed (e.g., love and justice), but the Bible did not contain rules for the knowing the loving and just action for a particular time and place. The Christian, then, must have thought about the situation and chosen the morally right action (Beach, 1952).

Theology as Contemplation

The creation of a new social order reliant upon the justice of God was argued for by Tyndale (2000/1528). While he did not believe in the usurpation of the divinely ordained rulers, he did believe in a civil disobedience that refused to acquiesce to injustice. His thinking and reflection about God led him to take moral actions regardless of the temporal law. For the Christian, critical thinking was expected. Protestant theology considered human rationality to separate humankind from other creatures (Beach, 1952).

Kantian ethicists misconstrued the abusive records of many churches and nations, operating under the name of Christianity, to be, in fact, Christianity (Ferre, 1951). The reality, however, was that Christianity theology consisted of a far more autonomous and principled ethical system. Still, it would be going too far to link Christian ethics with the

strict humanism of Kant. Ferre's view of Christian theology informed a far more balanced ethic of freedom, one balanced by an authority that enlivened freedom.

The simplest way to exhibit this relationship between authority and autonomy in the Christian faith is to define the nature of Christian authority.... We Christians have no magic book to be used indiscriminately, unintelligently, and woodenly. Such an authority would indeed make us guilty of heteronomous ethics...! Nor do we accept the decrees of an infallible human institution with the keys to bind the consciences of men.... If any organization of men could decree for other men what their eternal obligation is and substitute such decrees for people's own moral insight and conscience, we certainly should have a damaging moral heteronomy.... The nature of Christian authority is, rather, the love of God in Christ Jesus.... Christian love by its very nature bestows freedom on the objects of its love. God is not concerned with the manufacture of puppets but with the maturing of children.... Not only is this authority thus not inconsistent with freedom, but, in fact, agape as authority expresses its very self by the creation and the fostering of such freedom. In this sense, then, authority and autonomy both coincide and reinforce each other.... Christian authority is of such a nature as to effect autonomy. Therefore the distinction between the two concepts is false.... (pp. 249-250)

Waltke (1995) similarly argued for a moral theonomy based on the individual's "sound judgment," used in conjunction with the Bible and the Holy Spirit (p. 143). The Christian use of rationality, however, was preceded by an understanding that "God's Word is certain; human reason is less certain" (p. 145). Therefore, the Christian did not disregard the Bible. The Christian used reason to apply biblical principles.

Most secular philosophy scholars misconstrued Kant to be more antagonistic to religion than was warranted by his writings (Hare, 2001). According to Hare, Kant did not argue moral laws were entirely self-created. Instead, Kant sought to find a way in which moral law was not homocentric or theocentric but was eternally pre-existent with God. Through such a philosophy, Kant's appeals to moral law were not appeals to man-made law or God-made law but simply to law.

Kant believes that autonomy is not only consistent with submission to political authority, but requires that submission. His argument is that coercion by the state is necessary in order to prevent coercion by individuals.... External compulsion by the state is thus ‘a hindering of the hindrances to freedom.... It is only within a civil condition , where there is a legislator to enact laws, an executive to enforce them, and a judiciary to settle disputes about rights by reference to such public laws, that human beings can do what it can be known a priori they must be able to do in accordance with moral principles....’ A citizen is in this way morally justified in adopting into her own will the will of the ruler. The analogy with God’s rule is systematic.... God can punish and reward us. As we have already seen, this is not supposed to be the *ground* for our obedience. But it is essentially tied to the way in which God can be the author of the *obligation* to obey the law in a way that we are not. (pp. 109-110)

Baptist Individualism

According to Shurden (1998), the foundation for a distinction of Baptists was the consistent focus on liberty and conscience. Baptists were among the most individualistic denominations and pioneers in the concept of democracy (Harkness, 1939). Shurden traced Baptist beliefs in individualism and freedom of conscience back to the 1600s, a century before Kant.

While there has been a long academic and historical attempt to define Baptists, there were certain distinctions marking Baptist theology. One such distinction was religious autonomy. “For Baptists, private interpretation of Scripture is not a post-Enlightenment appropriation of democratic individualism and egalitarianism; it is part of their earliest seventeenth-century heritage” (Shurden, 1998, paragraph 20). John Leland, an 18th century Baptist, considered conscience to be fallible because humans did not always have the information necessary for rational decisions. Still, he believed a free conscience was far superior to government law (Moore, 1965). Williams, a 17th century

Baptist, was the first English writer to firmly set forth a principled claim for freedom of conscience and the first political leader to establish a system for the absolute protection of freedom of conscience (Noonan, 1987).

Baptists and Principled Morality

Baptists were early pioneers of human rights and had always emphasized issues of justice and freedom. A major difference between Baptist principles of human rights and humanistic principles, however, was that Baptists based their principles on theology, not sociology (Shurden, 1998). Baptists were arguing for extensive human rights (see Helwys, 1997/1612) decades before Hobbes (1997/1651), who was a forerunner of liberal humanism, was even arguing for the most basic right to life. According to Shurden:

What distinguished early Baptists was the conviction that all human beings, redeemed or not, have a God-given freedom to follow conscience in matters spiritual and religion. Early Baptists, as did other Christians of their time, assumed that freedom for living fully, authentically, and genuinely was found in Christ. Where Baptists differed with their culture was believing that people had as a gift from God the right to choose that path. Freedom came with creation, as well as redemption.... The origin of human rights is not found in the rationalism and individualism of the Enlightenment but in the free churches at the time of the Puritan Revolution. (paragraph 48)

The religious and political actions of Williams served as a prime example of early Baptist principles. Williams founded Rhode Island as the first government in the world to grant absolute freedom of conscience to all its residents. He specified Rhode Island's freedom would be available to all, including Jews, Muslims and atheists (Harkness, 1939). While modern democracy was theoretically rooted in Enlightenment philosophy, the Enlightenment philosophy was rooted in Calvinist theology. Although Williams

thought Quakers heretics, he ensured them absolute freedom of conscience within Rhode Island. Rather than use political power against those he considered heretics, he used preaching and writing in an attempt to show their errors (Moore, 1965).

To a great extent, modern political democracy was created by Williams (Harkness, 1939). Williams' writings on freedom of conscience were influential to the development of John Locke, who became a pivotal inspiration for the American Revolution (Moore, 1965). Williams recognized that the specific formation of a government system was somewhat arbitrary, that numerous types of systems existed throughout the world, and that many successful governments had existed in non-Christian nations. Still, within the range of options available, Williams insisted a government's legitimacy grew from the sanction of the citizens not any divine right granted to autocrats. Therefore, Williams outlined a legitimate rationale for revolution, based on the will of the people, more than a century before the US Declaration of Independence made a similar assertion (Harkness).

Williams argued the purpose of government was to preserve the natural freedom of each individual from the dangers of the state of nature, where everyone was free yet felt no security because he or she could be abused by anyone stronger (Harkness, 1939). Williams was outlining a liberal political philosophy well before Hobbes (1651/1652) challenged divine right and theorized the state of nature. The political and philosophical advances of Williams, according to Moore (1965), made it easy for many to categorize him as "an Enlightened secular liberal," or "as primarily a political thinker," (p. 58), but Williams was first and foremost a Puritan clergyman. As Moore stated, "Williams

was...distinguished from other New England Calvinists only by the consistency with which he carried to conclusion some of the implications of assumptions common to them all” (p. 58).

Authority and Autonomy in Baptist Theology

According to Cullen (1998), the medieval church made the error of presenting their doctrine as the infallible rule, and thus creating an idol. In contrast, the Enlightenment thinkers made their own understanding the infallible rule, creating a different idol. Cullen argued, however, that Christian theology required both doctrine and rationality to serve as tools for interpreting the actual infallible tool, the Bible. Protestants held a tension between biblical authority and personal religious autonomy (Beach, 1952).

Rationalism insisted people could not turn to external inspiration for moral conviction and that people must have sought their own realization above all else. Rationalists, such as Kant, misunderstood the concept of theological authority, however. According to Beach (1952), Christians believed theological commitment was so internalized that it was an internal source of wisdom.

For when the self really acknowledges the sovereignty of God over him, that acknowledgement is an inward appropriation so intense that the self no longer feels the authority to be something ‘over against’ him, something hostile to his true self, but rather the expression of his true self. The authority now compels him from within, not from without. (p. 111)

Christianity was not a religion of prescription. It was a religion of incredible thought and purpose in decision making. Beach (1952) and Waltke (1995) asserted Christians enjoyed tremendous latitude of morally right action within their daily lives.

Augustine described Christian moral action thusly, “Love God and do what you want” (as cited in Beach, p. 110).

While Catholic theology instituted the Church hierarchy as a source for absolute, trustworthy truth, Protestants had no such authority outside the Bible. Protestants had no chair from which a pope could proclaim *ex cathedra*. Protestants had no Catechism to interpret and apply the Bible for them. Protestants must have individually and collectively grappled with issues and hermeneutics. Beach (1952) described the Catholic/Protestant dichotomy as one of a difference of religious authority. “It is precisely the Protestant genius...to criticize under the Judgment of God, the finality of any *finite* authority as representing exhaustively the authority of the Infinite” (p. 112). Protestants welcomed reason into the moral debate. Still, Protestants treated reason differently than the rationalists. “Reason has an authoritative role. But it was a secondary role, to illumine the witness of the Word when the words were dark or obscure” (p. 113).

According to Kohlberg (1966), stage 6 thinkers used their “conscience as a directing agent” (p. 7). This was within the theological concepts of Waltke (1995) and Packer (1993). The role of conscience was integral to biblical morality.

Christian Education

Southern Baptists have traditionally placed great importance on education, especially higher education. In fact, the *Baptist Faith and Message*, which outlined the general beliefs of Southern Baptists, included an article on the establishment of a system of higher education. Hobbs (1971), one of the 20th century’s most influential Baptist

leaders, was instrumental in formulating the *Baptist Faith and Message*. According to Hobbs, “Since all social injustice is rooted in sin in the human heart, efforts for improving the social order and establishing righteousness must begin in the regeneration of the individual person” (p. 129). Clearly, Southern Baptists were concerned with education and social justice.

While Baptists had been significantly involved in higher education, they also had an historical commitment to education in churches. Moral development was a central focus in both realms of education. Dockery (2000), as the president of a Southern Baptist college, had suggested Christian higher education must be committed to moral development and that cognitive development was a significant factor in moral development. Tidwell (1996), who was a leading scholar in the study of church education, argued the educational mission of a church relied on the proper critical thinking of Christians. Baptist churches and Baptist colleges were expected to encourage Christians to think critically and question their faith as a means of developing more mature faith.

Baptists were involved in American higher education from an early stage. Baptists, and particularly Southern Baptists, had a rich tradition in higher education, having founded many of America’s great schools such as Brown, George Washington, Mercy and Baylor Universities. In fact, Brown University was uniquely Baptist among the early American universities. The Baptist theology of individual liberty led Brown to hold “the most liberal character” of the Ivy League schools. Brown was also noteworthy

in that “all members [of its community] were to enjoy full, free, absolute, and uninterrupted liberty of conscience” (Johnson, 1955, p. 5).

According to Johnson (1955), Baptist colleges were also especially focused on the moral development of students. “The main purpose in the [biblical] educational philosophy...[was] the development of noble individual character, the motivating force in Christian men and women who, in consequence, would stand for and promote social justice. Christian educators today proclaim that same purpose” (Johnson, 1955, p. 1). Johnson discussed social justice as an outcome of education prior to Kohlberg’s or Rawls’s work.

The research of Kohlberg and Fowler was used by Cullen (1998) to outline the necessity of critical reflection in the moral and spiritual development of Christians. Such an educational pedagogy was intended to holistically develop the Christian student. Christians, according to Cullen, were obligated to earnestly think about and evaluate their faith.

The primary functions of Christian education, according to Tidwell (1996), were to promote Christian involvement in issues of social justice. If the church was to teach principles of moral conduct, social justice, and critical thinking, Kohlberg’s theory and the DIT should be significantly related to the church’s mission. One reason so many researchers have found lower reasoning in some Christian populations may be the failure of some religious education. Schultz and Schultz (1996) believed one problem with church education was a frequent absence of attention to critical thinking despite

understanding that critical thinking was essential to fulfillment of the church's educational mission.

In a survey by Hoge et al. (1982), religious educators and Christian parents were asked about their foci in church curriculum development. Baptist educators agreed "the main goals of Christian education" include promoting "justice in the local community" (pp. 233-234). Baptist educators ranked "justice" higher than educators from Church of God, Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal and Catholic churches. Only Methodist parents ranked "justice" higher than Baptist parents. Hoge et al. showed tremendous support for social, political and critical thinking in church education among Baptist parents and educators.

Despite high interest in justice, Baptists ranked the educational goals, "the struggle for justice is a rightful concern of the church," and "shows concern about liberation of oppressed people," lower than members of any of the other denominations. Baptists were also lowest ranking the statements, "willing to work publicly to protest social wrongs" and in "appreciates his or her personal responsibility as a Christian for combating social evils" (Hoge et al., 1982, pp. 233-234).

In critical thinking statements, both Baptist parents and educators ranked the goal of "evaluate the different claims" of other faiths higher than people of other denominations (Hoge et al., 1982, p. 234). Baptist educators were second (insignificantly behind Episcopalians) on the statement, "understands Christianity both from within his or her own tradition and also critically, as if from outside." Baptist parents were highest on that statement of critical thinking. Baptist educators were highest in "responsible view

toward moral questions.” Both Baptist educators and parents were highest in “values the Bible as inspiration for personal spiritual growth,” “can identify important assumptions and implications of Christian teachings,” and “distinguishes between the values of culture and the values of the Gospel” (pp. 234-235). Baptists ranked “reflective understanding” of their faith and “moral maturity” higher than any denomination (p. 238).

A key to understanding these differences was found in what members of denominations ranked as most important. Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal and Catholic educators ranked “has a healthy self-concept” higher than any other goal. Conversely, Baptist educators ranked “has a personal relationship with Jesus Christ” as the primary goal (Hoge et al., 1982, p. 236).

Baptists ranked statements regarding broad moral principles such as justice higher than other denominations. When the questions concerned social action, however, Baptists ranked the statements lower than did members of mainline denominations. A possible explanation is the obvious connotation of such action with the liberalism of the 1960s and 1970s. In broad terms, Baptists considered social issues and religious critical thinking extremely important. When asked whether Christian youth should be encouraged to march in local protests, however, the Baptists were not as supportive (Hoge et al., 1982).

Baptists believed social injustice should be fought by the church, but likely did not want their churches to become the liberal bastions other denominations had become since the 1970s. The distinction in mission was exemplified by the evangelical focus on conversion and the mainline focus on self-esteem. Liberal denominations ranked goals of Unitarianism and theological uncertainty as being supremely important. Religious

conviction and morality were most important to Southern Baptists, and to a lesser extent Church of God members. Taken as a whole, the results of the study supported the contention that Southern Baptist religious educators and parents take issues of justice and critical thinking more seriously than do members of the other five denominations.

According to Stubblefield (1993), “Spiritual maturity includes the ability to make ethical and moral decisions in keeping with the Christian faith” (p. 168). Reinsmith (1995) argued Christians were obligated to think critically about their faith so as to separate false doctrines from those that could be carried forward. Even then, Christians were to maintain a “healthy doubt” which would lead to the development rather than destruction of faith. Baptists were believers in absolute, universal principles and in the importance of critical reflection and social justice. These values and practices of Baptists were well aligned with the theoretical foundations of Kohlberg and Rest.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In 1995, the federal government cut Higher Education Act funding for educational rehabilitation programs. The warden at Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP), Burl Cain, began thinking of new ways to educate the prisoners (Frink, 2004). Cain partnered with the Judson Baptist Association, Louisiana Baptist Convention, and the New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary (NOBTS) to bring a privately funded theological education to the prison (Baker, 2000).

NOBTS and LSP created a college program offering associate and bachelor's degrees to prison inmates. The prison college opened in 1995, awarded its first associate degrees in 1998 and its first bachelor's degrees in 2000 (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2000). In 2004, LSP was the only prison in the United States offering bachelor's degrees to inmates (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2000; 2001). The LSP campus of NOBTS was one of 17 NOBTS extension centers and was regionally accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (Frink, 2002; Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2001)

A primary goal of the Seminary was the moral development of students. Warden Cain had said, "I wish other prison wardens could realize what we learned—that the only rehabilitation is moral rehabilitation" (Frink, 2004, p. 39). Robert Toney, a chaplain at Angola, had also emphasized the moral nature of the Seminary program in his statement

“Moral rehabilitation is the only rehabilitation that works. If you just have education, what you have done is just created a smarter criminal. The change must come from within” (“Confronting recidivism,” 2005, p. 108).

Cain viewed faith-based efforts as the most promising development in criminal rehabilitation. He has said “nothing else but [the religious programs] should get the credit [for Angola’s change]. We always had the educational programs. The only thing we did different was we brought God to Angola” (Frink, 2004, p. 39). The program was considered such a success in 2004 that wardens from prisons in other states were asking NOBTS to consider opening campuses at their prisons (Myers, 2004). NOBTS subsequently opened a new campus at the Mississippi State Penitentiary and the Seminary was developing programs in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama (Myers, 2005).

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP). Specifically, this study was designed to evaluate the program’s effect on the moral development of students at LSP. An attempt was made to include a census of all students in the LSP Seminary population.

The evaluation of the Seminary at LSP was important as various national policies continued to emphasize faith-based initiatives, while other policies led to America imprisoning a higher ratio of its population than any other nation in the world (Mauer, 2003). The study of moral development was a salient issue to the American public, as well (Rest et al., 1999). From the frames of higher education, political science and

criminal justice scholarship, this program evaluation was thought to be potentially helpful to researchers, administrators, policy makers and bureaucrats in making more informed and effective decisions. This evaluation could also serve social scientists and philosophers in terms of advancing their understanding of the social, psychological and spiritual development of human beings.

Despite the relevance of this program to so many fields of scholarship, no previously published studies concerning the Seminary at LSP were located during the review of the literature and related research. Searches were conducted through a variety of databases, including Dissertation Abstracts, ERIC, Professional Development Collection and Academic Search Premier. This program evaluation stood to fill an important gap in scholarship.

Primary Research Question

To what extent do students in the NOBTS program at LSP develop moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry?

Research Question 1a

What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary students?

Research Question 1b

What, if any, statistically significant relationships exist between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types?

Population and Sample

The LSP Seminary program enrolled 101 students in the fall 2005 semester. Because the population was relatively small and the measurement instruments allowed groups to be evaluated at reasonable costs, the entire program population was invited to participate in the study. The DIT-1 and DIT-2 required moderate reading levels (Rest et al., 2000). Consequently, the use of a control group was determined to be impractical. Appropriate reading levels could not be assured for any random group of prisoners outside the college program.

While an attempt was made to include a census of the population, all participants were informed of their rights, including the right to not participate. Particular attention was made to practice informed consent consistent with the Common Rule subsection on research involving prisoners (45 CFR 46, subpart C).

In addition to the involvement of the program population, additional data were gathered from the full-time faculty of NOBTS. The data gathered from the faculty were used in conjunction with program population data for the purpose of better addressing the overall research question posed in this study. Faculty data served as a benchmark for student moral development.

The original plan for the program evaluation included a census of the 66 full-time NOBTS main campus faculty. The faculty members were to be provided research materials, including informed consent, during one of their periodic faculty meetings. In September 2005, however, Hurricane Katrina caused the evacuation of the main campus and the dispersing of the Seminary faculty.

The Seminary administration, comprised of 15 faculty members who concurrently held administrative roles in the Seminary, moved temporarily to Atlanta, GA. Those 15 faculty members were asked to participate in this evaluation. An additional 15 non-administrative faculty members were randomly selected and asked to participate. The inclusion of faculty was chosen for three primary reasons. First, the lack of a control group limited the conclusions made from this study. A benchmark group was not the same as a control group, but provided some external measure. Second, Kohlberg found the moral reasoning of teachers directly impacted the moral development of students (Bar-Yam et al., 1980). An evaluation of faculty moral reasoning served to ascertain what level of moral reasoning was consistent with the program's intended outcomes. The third rationale for including faculty followed from the second rationale. An evaluation of the moral reasoning of faculty was sought to validate the DIT-2 for this study.

Instrumentation

Defining Issues Test 2

The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) was used as the measurement instrument for moral judgment. The DIT-2 was a paper-and-pencil instrument, which could be completed in approximately 45 minutes. The instrument involved five moral dilemmas presented as stories. The participant read each story and then categorized 12 statements as to their moral relevance for the dilemma. The DIT-2 was computer scored by the Center for the Study of Ethical Development.

The theoretical framework of the DIT and DIT-2 was presented as part of the review of the literature. In brief, the instrument was developed by Rest (1986) based upon Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral development. The DIT and DIT-2 were intended to provide quantitative scores for the moral judgment of participants.

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator

The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) instrument Form F was used to assess the personality types of participants. The MBTI instrument was a paper-and-pencil, multiple-choice instrument. Form F of the MBTI was a longer form, involving 166 items and was designed for use by researchers. Use of Form F was restricted to researchers authorized by the Center for Applications of Psychological Type (CAPT). CAPT authorized the researcher for this program evaluation to use Form F.

The MBTI's theoretical framework and relevant research were also discussed as part of the literature review. Based on the work of Jung, the MBTI instrument was developed by Myers and Briggs. The results of MBTI assessments included four general categories of personality with each category including two dichotomies. Participants were identified with one of the two dichotomies in each category.

Instrument Reliability and Validity

DIT Reliability and Validity

Rest (1986) believed the evidence for a cognitive theory of moral development was so strong that, "if a person remains skeptical on the point that there are age trends in moral judgment, it is doubtful that any finding in all of social science will be acceptable" (pp. 29, 32). One of the fundamental validity traits in Kohlberg's theory was that numerous studies had shown stage-progression was age-related. Similarly, early research of the DIT supported its ability to measure moral development as a factor of cognitive maturation. According to Rest (1986), "age/education accounts for 30 to 50 percent of the variance in DIT scores" (p. 176). So, the general theory of a cognitive basis for moral development was well supported.

Researchers had found the DIT was sufficiently reliable with reliability coefficients usually in the .70s and .80s (Rest et al., 2000). The DIT had an internal reliability, using Chronbach's alpha, of .76, while the shorter DIT-2 increased reliability to .81. Combining the DIT and DIT-2 increased reliability to .90 but did not yield

significantly different results (Rest et al., 1999). The reliability of the DIT and DIT-2 were based upon hundreds of thousands of administrations. The DIT and the DIT-2 correlated extremely well with each other (Rest et al., 1999).

The DIT had been validated in terms of cognitive measurement, longitudinal consistency, age and educational discrimination, reliability and other measures of professional ethics and social issues through more than 400 studies. Still, the publisher of the DIT was seeking to gather more data, especially data pertaining to demographic groups most salient to the DIT construction and theory (Rest et al., 1999). Because this study concerned the professional preparation of clergy, this research had the potential to make a valuable contribution to the research literature.

According to Rest (1986), a large percentage of studies involving the DIT used small sample sizes and often involved no more than a couple dozen participants (Rest, 1986). Literature reviewed for this dissertation included numerous studies with small sample sizes. Many of the studies included similar, and sometimes smaller, sample sizes than the number participants surveyed in this research (Ang, 1989; Blizard, 1980; Catoe, 1992; Faqua, 1983; Griffore & Samuels, 1978; Leland, 1990; Nelson, 2004; Watt et al., 2000). Some studies used negligibly larger sample sizes (Hoagland, 1984; Walters, 1980; Warren, 1992; Washington, 1999).

This study involved a population of 101 students. The size of the population was appropriate for the DIT instrument and yielded reliable and valid statistics. The literature review conducted for this study demonstrated the theoretical validity of the DIT-2 for this particular evaluation.

The DIT had been used with Christian populations in numerous studies. Quite often, Christian populations scored at approximately the national average. Many other studies had shown Christians to score below average. Christian education, however, was intended to develop the critical thinking skills consistent with principled reasoning on the DIT. The DIT was not a perfect measure of Christian morality, as it was not designed for Christians; however, the DIT did meet the validity requirements for this program evaluation. Further, the DIT was determined to be the most appropriate measure available for this research.

MBTI Reliability and Validity

The MBTI instrument was a time-tested instrument with high reliability and validity. Internal reliability coefficients for middle-aged adults exceeded .90 for each of the four dichotomies. Test-retest reliabilities were lower but still ranged from the low .60s to low .80s. The psychological nature of the MBTI caused the instrument to be susceptible to variations based upon testing conditions (Myers et al., 2003).

The validity of MBTI assessments had been evaluated by comparison with other psychological measures. For example, the MBTI dichotomies correlated modestly with corresponding dynamics of the 16 Personality Factors Questionnaire, the California Psychological Inventory, and the Strong Interest Inventory (Myers et al., 2003).

The MBTI instrument, like the DIT-2, was theoretically based on an assumption of universal applicability. Further, the MBTI instrument could not report negative results.

No score on an MBTI report should have been construed as a bad or poor score. All preferences were considered healthy aspects of human personality (Myers et al., 2003).

Despite the presumption of all types being equal, there were researchers who had indicated type differences in moral reasoning; however, these findings actually supported the validity of both the MBTI and the DIT for this program evaluation. Type differences in moral reasoning largely fit what researchers might logically conclude based upon type and moral stage descriptions.

The type differences in moral reasoning bore significance on the interpretation of results for this study. The literature supported a hypothesis that Introvert (I), Sensing (S), Feeling (F) and Judging (J) preferences would be overrepresented among LSP Seminary students. The S, F and J preferences were predictive of lower moral reasoning scores. The tendency of these types to predict lower moral reasoning did not, however, negate the use of the DIT for this population. Instead, understanding these types allowed better type-appropriate interpretation of DIT scores.

Data Collection

Students in the LSP Seminary program received letters inviting them to participate in this study. The letters provided informed consent and requested their signatures indicating whether they did or did not agree to participate. Those students who agreed to participate completed the DIT-2 and MBTI in a classroom setting at Angola. Researchers including prisoners as participants needed to be especially conscious of the particular requirements of Common Rule subpart C. To ensure LSP Seminary students

did not feel any undue pressure to participate in this study, those students who attended received informed consent in written form and verbally from the researcher prior to their completing of the research instruments. LSP guards were not in the classroom during the research process.

Each participant received an envelope containing the DIT-2 and the MBTI. Each envelope was marked with a particular participant's name. The instruments, however, were only marked with the student's unique identification number created by the researcher for this program evaluation. When participants completed the instruments, the DIT-2, the MBTI, and the envelopes were each returned separately to the researcher. This method ensured anonymity. Individual students were known only to the researcher; once documents were returned to the researcher, they were placed in a bag that did not leave the researcher's possession at any time in LSP.

The research involving the full-time faculty at the NOBTS main campus was conducted in accordance with informed consent. To obtain participation from those faculty members in Atlanta, the researcher delivered the materials to the offices of the faculty members. The faculty members were requested to complete the DIT-2 and return the instruments by mail to the researcher. Stamped, addressed envelopes were provided to each faculty member. The Seminary was not able to provide mailing addresses of those faculty members not in Atlanta. The researcher, in requesting participation, e-mailed informed consent information to the 15 randomly selected faculty members. Faculty members who agreed to participate voluntarily provided current mailing addresses. Materials, including informed consent letters, were then mailed to participating faculty.

Data Analysis

The Primary Research Question posed in this study was focused on the extent to which students in the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. The question was designed to allow holistic analysis appropriate to this unique faith-based program evaluation. The analysis for this question was dependent upon answers to the two sub-questions, Research Question 1a and Research Question 1b.

Research Question 1a inquired as to any statistically significant differences in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level LSP Seminary students. Data obtained from the DIT-2 P scores and demographic information from the DIT-2 were analyzed. The Center for the Study of Ethical Development provided results in an SPSS file. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to investigate differences in dependent variables and the independent variable. Statistical significance was calculated based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5 percent.

Research Question 1b addressed any statistically significant relationships identified between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types. Data obtained from the DIT-2 and MBTI were used in the analysis. Moral judgment was categorized by P scores. Personality type variables included each of the eight individual dichotomy designations (I, E, S, N, T, F, J and P), the 16 personality types (e.g., INTP), the 4 personality temperaments (SJ, SP, NT and NF) and Richardson's (1996) four spiritualities (NF, NT, SF and ST). ANOVAs were used to investigate differences in the dependent variable and the independent variables. Statistical

significance was calculated based upon a probability of Type I error of less than 5 percent.

The literature reviewed relevant to this program evaluation was limited in significant areas of content. Little research was available concerning the moral development of prisoners or the moral development of Baptist seminarians. While questions of statistical significance could be determined quantitatively, program success had not been similarly defined.

An evaluation of the program's effectiveness in facilitating moral development necessitated consideration of initial moral judgment and the moral judgment of exiting students, as well as the general progress shown across each year of schooling. Additionally, an evaluation of the moral development of students included the assessment of growth respective to personality. Finally, this program evaluation necessitated consideration of what moral judgment was reasonable and appropriate for this population. The results of faculty evaluations facilitated creating a benchmark for what moral judgments were consistent with Baptist theology.

Summary

The LSP Seminary program had existed for a decade and had been credited with substantial success in the reform of the Angola environment. The program model was expanding across the state of Louisiana and was now being incorporated into the correctional programs of other states. No research had been conducted, however, to

evaluate this program. The purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate the LSP Seminary's success in facilitating moral development of students.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction

This study was conducted during fall of 2005 in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the LSP Seminary program in achieving the goal of moral development among students. Students were asked to complete the DIT-2 and MBTI instruments, and 30 NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2.

The LSP Seminary population consisted of 101 students. Of the 101 students in the program, 95 agreed to complete the DIT-2, for a response rate of 94%, and 98 completed the MBTI instrument, for a response rate of 97%. In addition to the student responses, 30 full-time NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2. The contacted faculty members included 15 administrators who held faculty rank and 15 non-administrative professors. Of the 15 administrative faculty members, four agreed to participate, for a response rate of 27%. Of the 15 randomly selected non-administrative faculty members, 2 agreed to participate, for a response rate of 13%. These responses represented 9% of the total NOBTS full-time faculty.

Response rates for faculty members were low, overall. Because the faculty member data were to be used only for benchmarking, the response rates were deemed sufficient for this evaluation. The low response rates might be attributable to the time requirements of the DIT-2 and the stressors undoubtedly facing faculty members still recovering from Hurricane Katrina.

Research Questions

The data from the survey instruments were collected and analyzed to answer a single Primary Research Question, which was focused on the extent to which students in the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. Analysis of the data gathered to respond to the two sub-questions, Research Question 1a and Research Question 1b, formed the basis for answering the primary question. The following sections provide narratives and tabular displays for each of the research sub-questions, which enable a response to the Primary Research Question.

Research Question 1a

What, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary students?

To answer this question, the DIT-2 was administered to students who agreed to participate in this study. The dependent variables investigated were the DIT-2 P scores and stage scores. The independent variable was the individual student's class year.

The DIT-2 included an overall P score, as well as scores for the individual's likelihood of preferring choices at each of the two lower stages. Stage23 represented choices based on self-interests. Stage4 represented choices based upon maintaining social norms. A successful program would ideally increase P scores across time and decrease Stage23 scores across time. Successful changes in Stage4 scores would be factors for

students' levels as they began the program, because Stage4 is a transitory stage between Stage23 and principled thinking, represented by the P scores.

The DIT-2 included several internal reliability controls. In test administrations, it was common for 10% or more of the respondents to be disqualified due to internal reliability checks (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). In this administration, a mere 3% of respondents were disqualified from the final data due to internal consistency checks. A final sample size of 92 respondents was included in the analysis of the DIT-2 data, representing 91% of the entire population and 97% of the participating students. The independent variable scores for the 92 reported students are shown in Table 5.

To answer Research Question 1a, ANOVAs were conducted for the independent and dependent variables. The analysis did not achieve statistical significance for any of the dependent variables. The results for P scores were $F(3,88) = 1.2, p > .05$; for Stage23 were $F(3,88) = 1.0, p > .05$; and for Stage4 were $F(3,88) = 0.62, p > .05$. Results of ANOVAs did not support the rejection of the null hypothesis. Results of the analysis of variance for the independent and dependent variables are reported in Table 6.

A visual check of the mean scores revealed an apparent change in scores across the four years of college. The changes in scores, however, did not achieve statistical significance. One possible reason for the lack of significance may be wide variances in P scores. The variances of scores for each class are shown in Table 7. The variances in freshmen scores were much greater than were the variances in the other years.

Table 5
Independent Variable Scores for Participating Students by Class Year (N = 92)

Independent Variables	<i>N</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>sd</i>
Freshmen			
P Score	33	24.5609	15.14261
Stage23	33	26.2012	13.01753
Stage4	33	43.3476	16.67556
Sophomores			
P Score	12	25.5250	9.06834
Stage23	12	22.1883	9.91914
Stage4	12	49.7875	10.10383
Juniors			
P Score	25	30.2744	13.16482
Stage23	25	22.0032	10.74928
Stage4	25	44.0424	12.22368
Seniors			
P Score	22	29.2273	9.84611
Stage23	22	21.2955	13.09185
Stage4	22	45.3864	15.34363
Total			
P Score	92	27.3551	12.84973
Stage23	92	23.3639	12.08941
Stage4	92	44.8639	14.42715

Table 6
Anova Results for the Independent and Dependent Variables

Variables	Variance	SS	df	Mean square	F	Sig.
P score	Between	588.007	3	196.002	1.195	.317
	Within	14437.501	88	164.063		
	Total	15025.508	91			
Stage23	Between	422.659	3	140.886	.963	.414
	Within	12877.331	88	146.333		
	Total	13299.990	91			
Stage4	Between	389.654	3	129.885	.616	.606
	Within	18551.339	88	210.811		
	Total	18940.993	91			

Table 7
Minimum, Maximum and Range of Participants' Scores by Class Year (N = 92)

Class Year	Range	P Score	Stage23	Stage4
Freshmen	Minimum	.00	.00	16.00
	Maximum	66.00	48.00	74.47
	Range	66.00	48.00	58.47
Sophomores	Minimum	8.00	4.26	38.00
	Maximum	38.30	38.00	68.00
	Range	30.30	33.74	30.00
Juniors	Minimum	8.00	4.08	22.00
	Maximum	54.00	40.00	66.00
	Range	46.00	35.92	44.00
Seniors	Minimum	10.00	6.00	20.00
	Maximum	48.00	48.00	70.00
	Range	38.00	42.00	50.00

The program evaluator chose to test for statistical outliers to determine if the variances may have affected statistical significance. This exploration of data was chosen after the initial tests came close to statistical significance, but did not achieve significance. SPSS was used to test for outliers, and two outliers were found in the P scores of the freshmen students. No outliers were found among the other stage scores. The two freshmen outliers had P scores of 66 and 58. Those P scores would have been very high scores among the general public and represented the two highest scores in the entire LSP Seminary sample. These scores approximated those found among students in theologically liberal seminaries ($m = 57.6$) and moral philosophy graduate students ($m = 64.4$) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).

Outliers, by definition, skew the results of research. The outliers in this research posed a particular problem for evaluation because they were similar to scores of graduate students. An undergraduate program is unlikely to significantly improve the moral reasoning of such students; therefore, the program evaluator chose to conduct ANOVAs with the two outliers removed from the sample. Table 8 displays the comparison of P Scores with outliers included and excluded.

Table 8
P Scores: Freshmen and All Participating Students by Class Year

P Scores	<i>N</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>sd</i>
Freshmen			
P Score with outliers	33	24.5609	15.14261
P Score without outliers	31	22.1455	12.00184
Total			
P Score with outliers	92	27.3551	12.84973
P Score without outliers	90	26.5852	11.86991

Removing the outliers and conducting an analysis of variance of the remaining P scores resulted in the achievement of statistical significance, $F(3,86) = 2.8, p < .05$. The results of the ANOVA are reported in Table 9. With the outliers removed, a statistically significant difference was found among P scores across the four years of college. A Tukey post-hoc comparison was conducted. It was determined the differences existed between the freshmen and junior class years ($p < .05$).

Table 9
Analysis of Variance with Outliers Removed (N = 90)

Variance	SS	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between	1118.359	3	372.786	2.807	.044
Within	11421.267	86	132.805		
Total	12539.626	89			

In response to Research Question 1a, statistical significance was not found among the data. Although overall significance was not found, an after-the-fact analysis suggested that significant differences in P scores might be found if outliers were removed from the sample. The differences in P scores appeared between the freshman and junior class years.

No statistically significant differences were found in the Stage23 or Stage4 scores of the Seminary population. A trend of differing scores was observed, however. Sophomores used Stage23 much less often than freshmen, while sophomores used Stage4 more frequently than freshmen. The more frequent use of Stage4 for sophomores was consistent with the less frequent use of Stage23. Juniors used Stage4 less frequently than sophomores. This would be required for continued growth in principled thinking. In total, mean scores showed inclinations toward Stage23 in the freshman year, Stage4 in the sophomore year, and principled thinking in the junior year. The changes in Stage23 and Stage4 scores, however, did not achieve statistical significance.

Research Question 1b

What, if any, statistically significant differences exist between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types?

This question was intended to facilitate the interpretation of moral judgment scores. As reported in Chapter 2, many researchers have found personality types to affect moral judgment. Further, the personality types typical of prisoners and vocational ministers were frequently associated with lower levels of moral judgment. Understanding the personality types of LSP Seminary students and any effects those types had on moral development would be beneficial to determining the success of the LSP Seminary program in promoting higher-level moral judgment.

The LSP Seminary population consisted of 101 students, 98 of whom completed the MBTI instrument. The results of the MBTI administration included classification of the dichotomy preferences for each participant as well as the classification of each participant's overall personality type. The personality type distributions among the participants are displayed in Table 10. Nearly half (44.9%) of LSP Seminary students were represented by just two of the sixteen types: ISTJ and ESTJ. This table shows the self-selection ratio of each category compared with the norms for male college students, shown in Chapter 2. Self-selection ratio scores above 1.0 indicate over-representation of the preference among the LSP Seminary population.

Table 10
 Participants' Personality Type Distributions (N = 98)

Personality Types	N	%	Self-Selection Ratio
ISTJ	27	27.55	2.21
ISFJ	10	10.20	1.88
INFJ	1	1.02	0.38
INTJ	7	6.14	1.14
ISTP	3	3.06	0.45
ISFP	4	4.08	1.00
INFP	2	2.04	0.38
INTP	3	3.06	0.46
ESTP	1	1.02	0.15
ESFP	4	4.08	0.93
ENFP	1	1.02	0.16
ENTP	2	2.04	0.30
ESTJ	17	17.35	1.35
ESFJ	13	13.27	2.43
ENFJ	0	0.00	0.00
ENTJ	3	2.04	0.35

Note. Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) types are comprised of: N=Intuition, S=Sensing, T=Thinking, F=Feeling, E=Extraverts, I=Introverts, J=Judging, P=Perceiving.

Table 11 displays the distribution of personality dichotomies. The four Sensing-Judging (S-J) personality types comprised the four most overrepresented types among Angola students. The four personality types most under-represented among the inmates were all Intuitive (N) types.

Table 11
Distribution of Personality Dichotomies (N = 98)

Indicators	N	%	Self-Selection Ratio
Extraversion (E)	41	41.84	0.82
Introversion (I)	57	58.16	1.19
Intuition (N)	19	19.34	0.46
Sensing (S)	79	80.61	1.38
Thinking (T)	63	64.29	1.01
Feeling (F)	35	35.71	0.98
Judging (J)	78	79.59	1.50
Perceiving (P)	20	20.41	0.43

Temperament and Spirituality distributions are shown in Table 12. The most common Temperament was SJ, represented by 68.37% of the sample. The Introversion (I), Sensing (S) and Judging (J) preferences were overrepresented among this sample. As was shown in Chapter 2, previous researchers found the Sensing and Judging preferences to be predictors of lower P scores and higher religiosity. Previous researchers have also found the Introversion and Sensing preferences to be overrepresented among prisoners. This study supported those previous findings.

Table 12
Participants' Temperament and Spirituality Distribution (N = 98)

Type	N	%
Temperaments		
Sensing Judging (SJ)	67	68.37
Sensing Perceiving (SP)	12	12.24
Intuition Thinking (NT)	15	15.31
Intuition Feeling (NF)	4	4.08
Spiritualities		
Intuition Feeling (NF)	4	4.08
Intuition Thinking (NT)	15	15.31
Sensing Feeling (SF)	31	31.63
Sensing Thinking (ST)	48	48.98

Research Question 1b was designed to provide further evidence needed to determine the LSP Seminary’s effectiveness in promoting moral development. The data were analyzed to determine what, if any, statistically significant differences exist in moral judgment scores based upon personality types. Mean P scores for each dichotomy are displayed in Table 13. Because several of the 16 personality types were represented by just one or two students, the researcher chose to not include P score means by types. This cautious decision was made to ensure confidentiality of assessment results.

The sample size for comparisons of type and P scores was reduced to 91 or 90% of the population. The sample size for Research Question 1b was smaller than the overall sample sizes because not all participants agreed to complete both instruments and three DIT-2 scores were rejected by the internal reliability controls.

Table 13
Mean P Scores for Personality Dichotomies (N = 98)

Indicators	N	<i>m</i>	<i>sd</i>
Extraverts	37	25.34	13.40548
Introverts	54	28.65	12.50986
Intuition	18	30.99	12.15744
Sensing	73	26.39	13.00952
Thinking	59	28.31	11.79711
Feeling	32	25.45	14.76865
Judging	73	26.91	12.24905
Perceiving	18	28.91	15.61170

To answer Research Question 1b, independent t-tests were conducted for each of the four dichotomies, and ANOVAs were conducted for the four Temperaments and the four Spiritualities. P scores served as the dependent variables; personality preferences

were used as independent variables. Mean P scores for each Temperament and Spirituality are shown in Table 14. No statistically significant differences were found in P scores based on any of the dichotomies, the Temperaments or the Spiritualities.

Table 14
Participants' Temperament and Spirituality P Scores

Type	N	<i>m</i>	<i>sd</i>
Temperaments			
Sensing Judging (SJ)	63	26.26	12.21948
Sensing Perceiving (SP)	10	27.23	18.01284
Intuition Thinking (NT)	14	34.00	12.07508
Intuition Feeling (NF)	4	20.50	4.12311
Spiritualities			
Intuition Feeling (NF)	4	20.50	4.12311
Intuition Thinking (NT)	15	34.00	12.07508
Sensing Feeling (SF)	31	26.15	15.63310
Sensing Thinking (ST)	48	26.54	11.26595

Faculty Data

Since it was necessary to determine what levels of moral reasoning were consistent with program goals and Baptist theology prior to answering the Primary Research Question, faculty data were also sought. The researcher chose to ask a sample of NOBTS full-time faculty members to complete the DIT-2. In addition to the student responses, 30 full-time NOBTS faculty members were asked to complete the DIT-2.

The faculty members contacted for participation included 15 administrators who held faculty rank and 15 non-administrative professors. Of the 15 administrative faculty members, four agreed to participate, for a response rate of 27%. Of the 15 randomly selected non-administrative faculty members, 2 agreed to participate, for a response rate of 13%. These responses represented 9% of the total NOBTS full-time faculty.

Response rates for faculty members were low, overall. Because the faculty member data were to be used only for benchmarking, the response rates were deemed sufficient for this evaluation. The low response rates might be attributable to the time requirements of the DIT-2 and the stressors undoubtedly facing faculty members still recovering from Hurricane Katrina.

The mean P score of NOBTS faculty members was 34.02 ($sd = 15.25$). A P score of 34.02 was lower than the average scores for American adults ($m = 42.8$) and Americans with research doctoral degrees who self-reported conservative political views ($m = 43.85$) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). A mean of 34.02 was also lower than the mean score of 35.17 ($sd = 11.69$) Nelson (2004) reported for Bible college students. Faculty scores ranged from 12 to 52.

Summary

The analysis of data for Research Questions 1a and 1b has been reported in Chapter 4 along with relevant data obtained from faculty members. In Chapter 5, the results of the study, focused around the Primary Research Question, will be addressed. Chapter 5 will include a summary and discussion of findings. Limitations of the study and recommendations for future research will also be presented.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to conduct a program evaluation for the Seminary at LSP. The Primary Research Question in this study addressed the extent to which students in the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry. Data gathered in the analysis of Research Questions 1a and 1b, as well as data gathered from NOBTS full-time faculty members, were useful in formulating a response to the single larger issue posed in this program evaluation.

Research Question 1a asked what, if any, statistically significant differences exist in the moral judgment of freshman, sophomore, junior and senior-level Seminary students. Differences in P scores did not achieve statistical significance; after removing two outliers, however, there was some indication that significant differences might exist between the freshman and junior years.

Research Question 1b asked what, if any, statistically significant differences exist between the moral judgment of LSP Seminary students of different personality types. No statistically significant type differences were found in moral reasoning of LSP Seminary students. While mean P scores by personality type did reveal some of the hypothesized differences, such as Intuitive Thinkers (NTs) scoring higher than other types, none of those differences reached significance.

In addition to Research Questions 1a and 1b, moral reasoning data were gathered from several NOBTS faculty members. The mean P score among faculty was 34.02 ($sd = 15.25$), with scores ranging from 12 to 52. The faculty data were incorporated with other data to address the Primary Research Question.

Summary and Discussion of Findings for the Primary Research Question

To answer the Primary Research Question, it was necessary to determine what levels of moral reasoning were consistent with program goals and Baptist theology. In order to reach this determination, the researcher chose to ask a sample of NOBTS full-time faculty members to complete the DIT-2.

The mean P score of NOBTS faculty members was 34.02 ($sd = 15.25$). A P score of 34.02 was lower than the average scores for American adults ($m = 42.8$) and Americans with research doctoral degrees who self-reported conservative political views ($m = 43.85$) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). A mean of 34.02 was also lower than the mean score of 35.17 ($sd = 11.69$) reported for Bible college students (Nelson, 2004). Faculty scores ranged from 12 to 52.

Comparisons of students' scores with various norms constituted a factor in answering the Primary Research Question. According to Rest (1979b), prisoners had been found to have a mean P score of 23.5. In this study, the freshman mean P score was 24.56. That score was reduced to 22.15 after removing the outliers. The LSP Seminary students were determined to have begun the program at approximately the expected level of moral reasoning. By the junior year, however, the mean P score of students was 30.27.

In regard to the extent to which students in the NOBTS program at LSP developed moral judgment consistent with program goals of rehabilitating students and preparing them for effective ministry, the researcher concluded differences in P scores among LSP Seminary students matched expectations for a successful program. Statistical significance was not achieved with the differences, however, unless outliers were removed. The differences in the mean P scores of students were greater than those typically reported in evaluations of college students. Freshman LSP Seminary students demonstrated at a level of moral reasoning equivalent to middle-income junior high school students ($m = 23.4$), while juniors scored equivalent to conservative community college students ($m = 30.75$) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003).

The results of MBTI assessments were also used to evaluate moral development respective to program goals. As described in Chapter 2, the demographics of LSP Seminary students were predictive of personality preferences related to lower levels of moral reasoning. In fact, preferences for Sensing (S) and Judging (J) were overrepresented among the LSP Seminary students. Past researchers have correlated the S and J preferences with lower P scores, and similar results were observed in this population. Type differences in P scores appeared as predicted with Introverts (I) scoring higher than Extraverts (E), Intuitives (N) scoring higher than Sensors (S), Thinkers (T) scoring higher than Feelers (F) and Perceivers (P) scoring higher than Judgers (J). Differences in mean P scores by preferences, however, did not meet the standard for less than 5% chance of Type I error. This means the relationship between moral development and personality type may be due to random error.

Despite the MBTI data failing to meet statistical significance, the data did fit the limited research available concerning other incarcerated men. The data also fit the findings of previous researchers who investigated personality and moral development. Therefore, while acknowledging the statistical chance results were caused by random error, it is reasonable to conclude LSP Seminary students do typically have personality preferences related to lower moral reasoning.

To answer the Primary Research Question, the results of Research Questions 1a and 1b were combined with the results of faculty evaluations. The analysis of Research Question 1a was not statistically significant unless two outliers were removed from the freshmen scores. The data observed matched expectations and after removing outliers there was an indication that statistically significant differences might exist among the class years. Further, the differences in moral reasoning were socially meaningful. Freshmen demonstrated moral reasoning typical of prisoners and junior high school students, while juniors demonstrated reasoning more typical of conservative community college students. Further, upper-level students used moral reasoning similar to some faculty members.

The moral reasoning of teachers was a powerful influence on the moral development of students (Bar-Yam et al., 1980). Freshman LSP Seminary students demonstrated a mean P score approximately 12 points below the mean score for faculty. The mean P score for juniors, however, was just 4 points below the mean for faculty.

According to Rest (1974), any program that could result in even modest moral gains among the “extremely problematic” population of prison inmates would be

“spectacular” (p. 250). In this study, the differences in moral reasoning found among LSP Seminary students were larger than those typical for college students. This evaluation, however, was only a cross-sectional study and the results cannot be generalized beyond this sample. Much more research is needed before reasonable claims may be made concerning program success. This study should be an impetus for such research.

Study Limitations

The use of faculty scores had significant limitations. The faculty invited to participate included full-time faculty on the Seminary’s main campus. Some of those faculty members had taught at LSP, while others had not taught at LSP. Some LSP courses had been taught by adjunct faculty. Further, the main campus of NOBTS offers several majors not offered at LSP; some main campus faculty taught in curricular majors, such as music and women’s ministry, that were not part of the Angola program. Consequently, the faculty scores provided inferential evidence, at best, for the teaching at Angola. Finally, the response rate of faculty invited to participate was sufficiently low to raise reasonable doubt as to the generalizability of scores. The wide range of P scores among faculty members made generalizability even more difficult.

Despite the limitations of the faculty data, the researcher believed faculty scores were valuable as a secondary source of information for evaluating the effectiveness of the LSP Seminary program. The faculty data were not essential to measuring the moral development of LSP students, but the faculty data were used to better understand the nature of the moral reasoning consistent with the LSP Seminary’s goals.

Implications for Policy and Practice

This study stood to fill a gap in research. The Seminary at LSP had been in operation for a decade without a significant program evaluation. No research had been conducted on the LSP Seminary program and little research had been conducted concerning moral rehabilitation of prisoners or the personality types of prisoners. Consequently, the praise given to the program by correctional officials, Seminary officials and the media was based largely on anecdotal information. Even with this study completed, more research is warranted for the program. Research is especially warranted in light of the program model's expansion into other states. This study should serve as an impetus for new research, which may help investigators support or refine the conclusions reported in this study.

At the present time, this study may serve policy-makers and stakeholders as evidence that continued support for this program is defensible. Perhaps more importantly, this study may provide necessary details for improving the program curriculum and achievement of student-learning outcomes.

One of the best ways for students to develop higher levels of moral judgment is to be exposed to higher-level reasoning. Because the faculty members scored higher, on average, than students, the faculty could potentially teach at levels above student reasoning. Such teaching would be conducive to development of students' moral reasoning. At the same time, the relatively low scores of faculty could pose a practical, and rather low, limit for student development. Course curricula, including exposure to philosophical and theological texts, may provide additional opportunities for students to

be exposed to principled thinking. Further, the wide range of scores found among students could allow significant moral dialogue inside and outside of classes.

Public policy addressing prisoner rehabilitation was important considering America's high rate of incarceration. Previous researchers often found little gain from prison education and the federal government discontinued support for post-secondary prisoner education. The LSP Seminary program may provide a model for how prison rehabilitation might be successful.

Recommendations for Future Research

This dissertation was narrowly focused on the single program goal of moral development. That focus was chosen because it was an often-cited goal of the program and had significant saliency for correctional leaders, policymakers, stakeholders, and the public. An LSP Seminary program evaluation could have been targeted at numerous other goals. Further research is warranted for the Angola program.

Because this dissertation was a cross-sectional study involving students from the fall 2005 semester, conclusions cannot be generalized beyond the specific sample. A longitudinal investigation may be especially beneficial in the case of the LSP Seminary. This researcher found a wide range of scores among students in each of the four class years; further, the two highest scores were found among freshmen. A longitudinal study might allow more accurate assessment of students' moral development.

A longitudinal study would allow assessment of how a student's moral reasoning at entry into the program affects the student's moral reasoning as a senior or at

graduation. Those entering with low scores have ample room for improvement during the college years. Conversely, this researcher can provide no indication what might happen to the two freshmen whose P scores were already extremely high. If Richards (1991) was correct, and Christian college students learn to reject higher levels of reasoning, the outliers' scores might actually decrease. This possibility seemed especially significant considering many students scored higher than most faculty members.

Although a very low percentage of Angola inmates are released from incarceration, an investigation of program graduates' recidivism could shed light on whether the moral development of students relates to improvements in behavior. The DIT was a measure of moral reasoning, rather than moral action. There was evidence the LSP environment had changed from frequent violence to relative calm during the years the Seminary has been operating at LSP. No definite connection can be made, however, between behavioral changes among Angola residents and the moral development of LSP Seminary students.

APPENDIX A: DEFINING ISSUES TEST 2

This questionnaire is concerned with how you define the issues in a social problem. Several stories about social problems will be described. After each story, there will be a list of questions. The questions that follow each story represent different issues that might be raised by the problem. In other words, the questionnaire/issues raise different ways of judging what is important in making a decision about the social problem. You will be asked to rate and rank the questions in terms of how important each one seems to you.

This questionnaire is in two parts; one part contains the **INSTRUCTIONS** (this part) and the stories presenting the social problems; the other part contains the questions (issues) and the **ANSWER SHEET** on which to write your responses.

Here is an example of the task:

Presidential Election

Imagine that you are about to vote for a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. Imagine that before you vote, you are given several questions, and asked which issue is the most important to you in making up your mind about which candidate to vote for. In this example, 5 items are given. On a rating scale of 1 to 5 (1=Great, 2=Much, 3=Some, 4=Little, 5=No) please rate the importance of the item (issue) by filling in with a pencil one of the bubbles on the answer sheet by each item.

Assume that you thought that item #1 (below) was of great importance, item #2 had some importance, item #3 had no importance, item #4 had much importance, and item #5 had much importance. Then you would fill in the bubbles on the answer sheet as shown below.

GREAT	MUCH	SOME	LITTLE	NO	Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)
X					1. Financially are you personally better off now than you were four years ago?
		X			2. Does one candidate have a superior personal moral character?
				X	3. Which candidate stands the tallest?
	X				4. Which candidate would make the best world leader?
	X				5. Which candidate has the best ideas for our country's internal problems, like crime and health care?

Further, the questionnaire will ask you to rank the question in terms of importance. In the space below, the numbers at the top, 1 through 12, represent the item number. From top to bottom, you are asked to fill in the bubble that represents the item in first importance (of those given to you to choose from), then second most important, third most important, and fourth most important. Please indicate your top four choices. You might fill out this part, as follows:

1 Most important item 5 Second most important
4 Third most important 2 Fourth most important

Note that some of the items may seem irrelevant to you (as in item #3) or not make sense to you—in that case, rate the item as “no” importance and do not rank the item. Note that in the stories that follow, there will be 12 items for each story, not five. Please make sure to consider all 12 items (questions) that are printed after each story.

In addition you will be asked to state your preference for what action to take in the story. After the story, you will be asked to indicate the action you favor on a seven-point scale (1= strongly favor some action, 7=strongly oppose the action).

In short, read the story from this booklet, then fill out your answers on the answer sheet. Please use a #2 pencil. If you change your mind about a response, erase the pencil mark cleanly and enter your new response.

[Notice the second part of this questionnaire, the Answer Sheet. The Identification Number at the top of the answer sheet may already be filled in when you receive your materials. If not, you will receive instructions about how to fill in the number. If you have questions about the procedure, please ask now.]

Please turn now to the Answer Sheet]

Famine—(Story #1)

The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but this year's famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves by making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh's family is near starvation. He has heard that a rich man in his village has supplies of food stored away and is hoarding food while its price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq is desperate and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man's warehouse. The small amount of food that he needs for his family probably wouldn't even be missed.

What should Mustaq Singh do? Do you favor the action of taking the food (Mark one.)

- Should take the food
 Can't decide
 Should not take the food

GREAT	MUCH	SOME	LITTLE	NO	<i>Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)</i>
					1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught for stealing?
					2. Isn't it only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would steal?
					3. Shouldn't the community's laws be upheld?
					4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark?
					5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are starving?
					6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family?
					7. What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?
					8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?
					9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?
					10. Isn't private property an institution to enable the rich to exploit the poor?
					11. Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or wouldn't it?
					12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of a society?

From the list above, select the four most important:

- Most important item Second most important
 Third most important Fourth most important

Reporter—(Story #2)

Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the *Gazette* newspaper for over a decade. Almost by accident, she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant Governor for her state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting 20 years earlier. Reporter Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson had undergone a confused period and done things he later regretted, actions which would be very out-of-character now. His shop-lifting had been a minor offense and charges had been dropped by the department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself out since then, but built a distinguished record in helping many people and in leading constructive community projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state. Reporter Dayton wonders whether or not she should write the story about Thompson's earlier troubles because in the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story could wreck Thompson's chance to win.

Do you favor the action of reporting the story? (Mark one.)

- Should report the story
 Can't decide
 Should not report the story

GREAT	MUCH	SOME	LITTLE	NO	<i>Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)</i>
					1. Doesn't the public have a right to know all the facts about all candidates for office?
					2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative reporting?
					3. If Dayton doesn't publish the story wouldn't another reporter get the story anyway and get the credit for investigative reporting?
					4. Since the voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton does?
					5. Hasn't Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than in his earlier days as a shop-lifter?
					6. What would best serve society?
					7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?
					8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story about candidate Thompson?
					9. Does the right of "habeas corpus" apply in this case?
					10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story?
					11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting everything she learns about them, good and bad?
					12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances?

From the list above, select the four most important:

- Most important item Second most important
 Third most important Fourth most important

School Board—(Story #3)

Mr. Grant has been elected to School Board District 190 and was chosen to be Chairman. The district is bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools. One of the high schools has to be closed for financial reasons, but there is no agreement over which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant had proposed a series of “Open Meetings” in which members of the community could voice their opinions. He hoped that the dialogue would make the community realize the necessity of closing one high school. Also he hoped that through open discussions, the difficulty of the decision would be appreciated, and that the community would ultimately support the school board decision. The first Open Meeting was a disaster. Passionate speeches dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed without fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone calls. Mr. Grant wonder if he ought to call off the next Open Meeting.

Do you favor calling off the next Open Meeting? (Mark one.)

Should call of the next open meeting

Can't decide

Should have the next open meeting

GREAT	MUCH	SOME	LITTLE	NO	<i>Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)</i>
					1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have Open Meetings on major school board decisions?
					2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by discounting the Open Meetings?
					3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grant if he stopped the Open Meetings?
					4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment?
					5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legal authority to protect the Board by making decisions in closed meetings?
					6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the open meetings?
					7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are heard?
					8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or prevent them from making long speeches?
					9. Are some people deliberately undermining the school board process by playing some sort of power game?
					10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community's ability to handle controversial issues in the future?
					11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads, and is the community in general really fair-minded and democratic?
					12. What is the likelihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion from the community?

From the list above, select the four most important:

Most important item Second most important

Third most important Fourth most important

Cancer—(Story #4)

Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in terrible pain and asks the doctor to give her more pain -killer medicine. The doctor has given her the maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because it would probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says that she realizes this, but wants to end her suffering even if it means ending her life. Should the doctor give her an increased dosage?

Do you favor the action of giving more medicine? (Mark one.)

Should give Mrs. Bennett an increased dosage to make her die

Can't decide

Should not give her an increased dosage

GREAT	MUCH	SOME	LITTLE	NO	<i>Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)</i>
					1. Isn't the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving an overdose would be the same as killing her?
					2. Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and cannot do?
					3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice?
					4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller medicine?
					5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?
					6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live?
					7. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation?
					8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or not?
					9. Wouldn't the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she died?
					10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end?
					11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed?
					12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to die if the person wants to?

From the list above, select the four most important:

Most important item Second most important

Third most important Fourth most important

Demonstration—(Story #5)

Political and economic instability in a South America country prompted the President of the United States to send troops to “police” the area. Students at many campuses in the U.S.A. have protested that the United States is using its military might for economic advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational companies are pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means loss of life. Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstration, tying up traffic and stopping regular business in the town. The president of the university demanded that the students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college’s administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the students right to demonstrate in these ways?

Do you favor the action of demonstrating in this way?

Should continue demonstrating in these ways

Can't decide

Should not continue demonstrating in these ways

GREAT	MUCH	SOME	LITTLE	NO	<i>Rate the following 12 issues in terms of importance (1-5)</i>
					1. Do the students have the right to take over property that doesn't belong to them?
					2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
					3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they doing it just for fun?
					4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more disorder?
					5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few student demonstrators?
					6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of the multinational oil companies?
					7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business leaders have more power than ordinary people?
					8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all people?
					9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience?
					10. Shouldn't the authorities be respected by students?
					11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
					12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the law, whether one likes it or not?

From the list above, select the four most important:

Most important item Second most important

Third most important Fourth most important

APPENDIX B: STUDENT INFORMED CONSENT LETTER

Bruce M. Sabin
[address]

[date]

Dear Leavell College student:

I graduated from Leavell College in 2000 and I am now a student at the University of Central Florida. With the support of my advisor, Dr. LeVester Tubbs, I am working on a research project for my degree. **I am asking for your help with my research.**

The purpose of my research is to learn about your college program at Angola. If you agree to participate, you will complete two surveys. **I will visit your class later this semester.** The students who volunteer to participate will complete two surveys at that time. You do not have to participate in my surveys, and if you agree to participate now, you are free to change your mind later.

The first survey is called the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2). This survey asks for your thoughts concerning how to handle social problems. You and your fellow students can provide important information on those topics because you are preparing to become leaders in your community. The DIT-2 will take about 45 minutes. The DIT-2 was written to understand how different people think about social problems.

Various people around the country and in many walks of life have responded to the DIT-2. It is important for you to know the DIT-2 asks questions about difficult social problems. But, that is why I think it is important to understand how community leaders like you think about these issues. If you agree to take the survey, you may choose not to answer any questions you do not want to answer. If you want to talk about the issues after the survey, there are people, such as your chaplains, professors and ministers, who would be available to you.

The second survey is called the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). The MBTI is designed to help people understand their own natural personalities and how God has made us. The MBTI will probably take about 30 minutes of your time. Later this year, I will visit Angola again to give a workshop to those students who participated in the MBTI. At the workshop, students will learn about the results of the MBTI and how learning about personalities can help us understand ourselves and others, especially in terms of our ministries. That workshop will take about 4 hours. Even if you agree to participate in my surveys, you do not have to come to the workshop. If you agree to come, though, I think you will have a good time and learn a lot. The workshop will be my way of thanking you for your help.

If you agree to participate, you will complete the surveys during your regular class time. **Participating in my research is not required by your college or your class and will not affect your grades or any other status at Angola.** This is completely voluntary to help me with my research project. The only direct benefit for you may be the opportunity to learn about personalities during the workshop later in the year. No other compensation is offered for your participation.

I will respect your privacy and will keep your personal survey responses absolutely private. I will keep your individual survey responses in a secure place. Only I will see your personal answers to the surveys. Any results of my research seen by other people at the College or Angola will be general information about students in the program, not about you personally. The surveys you complete will not have your name on them. Instead of a name, they will have a special number I create for you and that only I can connect to you personally. **I will keep your personal information completely confidential.**

Remember, whether or not you agree to help with this research is completely up to you. If you agree now, you can always change your mind later. And even when taking the surveys, you will not have to answer

any questions you do not want to answer. If you choose not to participate, you will be able to study in the library during the surveys.

Please check the box for whether you would like to participate or would not like to participate. I have also asked whether you would be willing to let me contact you in the future for other research projects. If you agree to let me contact you in the future, you are only agreeing to let me contact you and you are not making any promise to participate in those projects. If I contact you in the future, you will again have the opportunity to volunteer to participate or choose not to participate in those future projects. Please check the box for whether you agree to let me contact you again, or would rather not be contacted again. Then, **sign and date** the letter and return it to Dr. Robson, who is collecting these for me. I have also provided an extra copy of this letter for you to keep.

If you have any questions, you may ask Dr. Robson, who can pass the questions along to me, or you can write to me directly at the address below me name. You may also contact the University of Central Florida's Institutional Review Board with any questions about your rights in this research. The Board's address is: the UCFIRB office, University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 302, Orlando, FL 32826.

Thank you very much for your time.

Sincerely,

Bruce M. Sabin

[address]

Do you volunteer to participate in this research project?

- I have read the information above and **I voluntarily agree to participate** in the research. I have also received a copy of this letter.
- I have read the information above and **I choose not to participate** in the research. I have also received a copy of this letter.

May I contact you in the future about other research projects?

- I voluntarily agree to give permission** to be contacted in the future for other research projects.
- I choose not to give permission** to be contacted about future research projects.

Signature

Date

APPENDIX C: FACULTY INFORMED CONSENT LETTER

Bruce M. Sabin
[address]
(h) [home telephone number]
(w) [work telephone number]
[e-mail address]

[date]

Dear Dr. [name]:

I graduated from Leavell College in 2000 and I am now a doctoral student at the University of Central Florida. With the support of my advisor, Dr. LeVester Tubbs, I am working on working on my dissertation, which is a study an evaluation of Leavell's Angola campus. **I am asking for your help with my research.**

In my research, I am using the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) to investigate the moral reasoning of the Angola students. In order to establish a benchmark for students, I would like you and other NOBTS faculty to complete the DIT-2. I am presuming you and your colleagues represent the highest standards of Baptist thinking on moral issues.

The DIT-2 is a paper-and-pencil survey and should take between 30 and 45 minutes. I realize that is a substantial amount of your time, but I hope you will contribute to my research. Of course, your participation is completely voluntary.

Enclosed with this letter is the DIT-2 question booklet, an answer sheet, and a return envelope. If you choose to participate, please complete the DIT-2 and return the documents, including this informed consent letter, in the provided envelope. The answer sheet has a unique identification number I created for you. Only I can connect your number with your answers, and I will keep your results completely confidential. Any results reported will be in the form of aggregated data. Enclosed with these documents, I have also included a copy of this letter for you to keep. If you choose not to participate, I hope you will still complete this informed consent letter and return the incomplete documents.

If you have any questions, please contact me at the telephone number or address information at the top of this letter. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCFIRB office, University of Central Florida Office of Research, Orlando Tech Center, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 207, Orlando, FL 32826.

Thank you very much for your time.

Sincerely,

Bruce M. Sabin
Leavell College '00

- I have read the information above and **I voluntarily agree to participate** in the research. I have also received a copy of this letter.
- I have read the information above and **I choose not to participate** in the research. I have also received a copy of this letter.

Signature

Date

APPENDIX D: STUDENT DEFINING ISSUES TEST 2 DATA

Case	P Score	Stage23	Stage4
Freshmen			
101	0.0	48.0	50.0
102	2.0	48.0	38.0
103	8.0	34.0	48.0
104	8.5	10.6	74.5
105	12.0	42.0	32.0
106	12.0	28.0	56.0
107	12.0	20.0	68.0
108	14.0	32.0	42.0
109	16.0	22.0	48.0
110	18.0	16.0	50.0
111	18.0	40.0	42.0
112	18.0	12.0	70.0
113	18.0	26.0	48.0
114	20.0	14.0	66.0
115	20.0	18.0	52.0
116	22.0	20.0	58.0
117	22.0	32.0	46.0
118	22.0	38.0	30.0
119	22.0	22.0	56.0
120	22.0	46.0	20.0
121	24.0	24.0	52.0
122	24.0	32.0	44.0
123	24.0	24.0	46.0
124	28.0	48.0	16.0
125	30.0	30.0	24.0
126	36.0	0.0	64.0
127	36.0	34.0	16.0
128	40.0	6.0	50.0
129	42.0	34.0	22.0
130	46.0	6.0	40.0
131	50.0	26.0	22.0
132	58.0	24.0	18.0
133	66.0	8.0	22.0
Sophomores			
201	8.0	24.0	68.0
202	16.0	24.0	56.0
203	16.0	38.0	40.0
204	22.0	38.0	40.0

Case	P Score	Stage23	Stage4
205	24.0	12.0	60.0
206	24.0	28.0	38.0
207	28.0	22.0	50.0
208	28.0	14.0	58.0
209	32.0	18.0	50.0
210	34.0	26.0	40.0
211	36.0	18.0	40.0
212	38.3	4.3	57.5
Juniors			
301	8.0	40.0	50.0
302	16.0	24.0	54.0
303	16.0	18.0	66.0
304	16.0	20.0	60.0
305	18.0	22.0	42.0
306	20.0	36.0	42.0
307	20.0	26.0	52.0
308	22.0	34.0	40.0
309	22.0	12.0	64.0
310	24.0	34.0	42.0
311	24.0	14.0	62.0
312	26.0	18.0	56.0
313	28.0	36.0	32.0
314	28.0	28.0	42.0
315	30.0	16.0	50.0
316	32.0	40.0	26.0
317	36.0	34.0	30.0
318	36.0	20.0	40.0
319	38.0	16.0	36.0
320	42.9	4.1	53.1
321	46.0	8.0	42.0
322	48.0	16.0	34.0
323	52.0	18.0	22.0
324	54.0	6.0	34.0
325	54.0	10.0	30.0
Seniors			
401	10.0	22.0	62.0
402	14.0	38.0	46.0
403	22.0	16.0	44.0

Case	P Score	Stage23	Stage4
404	22.0	8.0	56.0
405	22.0	10.0	66.0
406	22.0	6.0	70.0
407	22.0	14.0	64.0
408	25.0	32.5	42.5
409	26.0	40.0	34.0
410	28.0	12.0	54.0
411	28.0	28.0	44.0
412	28.0	8.0	64.0
413	28.0	42.0	26.0
414	30.0	10.0	54.0
415	30.0	48.0	20.0
416	32.0	14.0	52.0
417	36.0	30.0	24.0
418	40.0	34.0	20.0
419	40.0	12.0	48.0
420	44.0	24.0	28.0
421	46.0	12.0	42.0
422	48.0	8.0	38.0

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